95 ideas
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
Full Idea: Save, maybe, for purely formal (e.g. logical) theories, philosophical claims whose correctness does not depend, however indirectly, on matters of fact are empty: they are neither true nor false. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I subscribe to this view. I'd even say that logic is empty if it is not answerable to the facts. The facts are nature, so this is a naturalistic manifesto. |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I sooner judged that what lacks all form does not exist, than thought of as something in between form and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, unformed and next to nothing. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XII.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
A reaction: Scholastics were struck by the contrast between this remark, and the remark of Averroes (Idea 16587) that prime matter was halfway existence. Their two great authorities disagreed! This sort of thing stimulated the revival of metaphysics. |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I am told that I can ask three sorts of questions - whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very Aristotelian approach. I am pleased to see that what it is and what sort it is are not conflated. The first one must be its individual essence, and the second its generic essence. |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists have attempted to determine whether a concept of a category stores some causal knowledge about the members, some knowledge about their typical properties, or some knowledge about specific members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.3.2) | |
A reaction: I take there to be a psychological process of 'generalisation', so that knowledge of individuals is not and need not be retained. I am dubious about entities called 'properties', so I will vote for causal (including perceptual) knowledge. |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Are categorisation under time pressure and categorisation without time pressure ...two different cognitive competences? | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 5.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist's question. Introspectively, they do seem to be rather different, as there is no time for theorising and explaining when you are just casting your eyes over the landscape. |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
Full Idea: I contend that the best available evidence suggests that for each category of objects an individual typically has several concepts. For instance, instead of having a single concept of dog, an individual has in fact several concepts of dog. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Machery's book is a sustained defence of this hypothesis, with lots of examples from psychology. Any attempt by philosophers to give a neat and tidy account of categorisation looks doomed. |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
Full Idea: A to-be-classified object is considered a category member to the extent that its features were likely to have been generated by the category's causal laws. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.4) | |
A reaction: [from Bob Rehder, psychologist, 2003] This is an account of categorisation which arises from the Theory Theory view of concepts, of which I am a fan. I love this idea, which slots neatly into the account I have been defending. Locke would like this. |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
Full Idea: There may be ad hoc categories, as when people think about the things to pack in a small suitcase for a trip abroad. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be obviously correct, though critics might say that 'category' is too grand a term for such a grouping. |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have rarely explained why they believe that there is a single correct way of individuating concepts. Many entities can be legitimately individuated in several ways. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 2.1.3) | |
A reaction: I cite this under 'individuation' because I think that is a very garbled concept. I agree with this point, even though I don't really know exactly what individuation is supposed to be. |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
Full Idea: If we had to experience sorrow or fear every time that we mentioned these emotions, no one would be willing to speak of them. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: Remembering the death of a loved one can trigger fresh grief, but remembering their dangerous illness from which they recovered no longer contains the feeling of fear. |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I can distinguish the scent of lilies from that of violets, even though there is no scent at all in my nostrils. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: Augustine has a nice introspective account of how we experience memory, and identifies lots of puzzling features. I know I can identify the smell of vinegar, but I can't bring it to mind, the way I can the appearance of roses. |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The mind and the memory are one and the same. We even call the memory the mind, for when we tell a person to remember something, we tell them to 'bear this in mind', and when we forget something 'it slipped out of my mind'. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: This idea has become familiar in modern neuroscience, I think, presumably because we do not find distinct types of neurons for consciousness and for memory. |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The memory contains the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can have been conveyed to me by the bodily senses. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.12) | |
A reaction: Even if you have a fairly empirical view of the sources of mathematics (a view with which I sympathise), it must by admitted that our endless extrapolations from the sources also reside in memory. So we remember thoughts as well as experiences. |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: How can it be that my mind can be happy because of the joy that is in it, and yet my memory is not sad by reason of the sadness that is in it? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: This seems to contradict his thought in Idea 22981, that memory and mind are the same. Recall seems to be a part of consciousness which is not fully wired up to the rest of the mind. |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Vertical arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms note that distinct types of generalisation do not line up with each other. ...It is argued that the theoretical term picks out more than one natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'depression', as behavioural and cognitive; the former includes apes, and the latter doesn't. It is a nice principle for tidying up theories. |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
Full Idea: Horizontal arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms say that some terms should be eliminated if they do not pick out a natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the one Machery likes, but I would say that it is less obvious than the 'vertical' version, since picking out a natural kind may not be the only job of a theoretical term. (p.238: Machery agrees!) |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a hypothesised natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind, keeping this theoretical term is likely to prevent the development of a new classification system that would identify the relevant kinds. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: I'm persuaded. This is why metaphysicians should stop talking about 'properties'. |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
Full Idea: Typically, psychologists use 'induction' to refer to the capacity to generalise a property from a category (the source) to another category (the target). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is because psychologists are interested in the ongoing activities of thought. Philosophers step back a bit, to ask how the whole thing could get started. Philosophical induction has to start with individuals and single observations. |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
Full Idea: Induction is 'ampliative' when it infers that all or most members of a category possess a property from the fact that some of its members have this property. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a simple step in reasoning, but actually it is more like explanation, and will involve overall coherence and probability, rather than a direct conclusion. This invites sceptical questions. The last one observed may be the exception. |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The memory is a vast immeasurable sanctuary. It is part of my nature, but I cannot understand all that I am. Hence the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. Is the other part outside of itself, and not within it? How then can it be a part? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: He seems to understand the mind as entirely consisting of consciousness. Nevertheless, this seems to be the first inklings of the modern externalist view of the mind. |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I do not understand the power of memory that is in myself, although without it I could not even speak of myself. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.16) | |
A reaction: Even if the self is not identical with memory, this idea seems to establish that memory is an essential aspect of the self. This point is neglected by those who see the self as an entity (the 'soul pearl') which persists through all experience. |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: How do prophets see the future, if there is not a future to be seen? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.17) | |
A reaction: The answer, I suspect, is that prophets can't see the future. The prospect that the future already exists would seem to saboutage human freedom and responsibility, and point to Calvinist predestination, and even fatalism. |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
Full Idea: Connectionists typically do not distinguish between processes and memory stores, and, more importantly, it is unclear whether connectionists can draw a distinction between the knowledge stored in a concept and the background. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: In other words connectionism fails to capture the structured nature of our thinking. There is an innate structure (which, say I, should mainly be seen as 'mental files'). |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
Full Idea: Categorization, deduction, induction, analogy-making, linguistic understanding, and planning - all of these are higher cognitive capacities. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: His 'lower' competences are perceptual and motor. I say the entry to the higher competences are abstraction, idealisation and generalisation. If you can't do these (chimpanzees!) you will not be admitted. |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
Full Idea: In memory everything is preserved separately, according to its category. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the first seeds of the idea that the mind functions by means of mental files. Our memories of cats are 'close to' or 'linked to' our memories of dogs. |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
Full Idea: In general, concepts that are used when we categorise and concepts that are used when we reason inductively could have little in common. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: In the end he is going to reject concepts altogether, so he would say this. Friends of concepts would be very surprised if the mind were so uneconomical in its activities, given that induction seems to be up to its neck in categorisation. |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
Full Idea: A theory of concepts should determine the knowledge stored in them, and the cognitive processes that use concepts. Ideally it should also characterise their format, their acquisition, and (increasingly) localise them in the brain. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Machery reveals his dubious scientism in the requirement to localise them in the brain. That strikes me as entirely irrelevant to both philosophy and psychology. I want the format, acquisition and knowledge. |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'concept' ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, and replaced by the notions of prototype, exemplar, and theory. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8) | |
A reaction: Machery's main thesis. I think similarly about 'property' in metaphysics. It embraces different ideas, and if we eliminated 'property' (and used predicate, class, fundamental power, complex power) we would do better. Psychologists have dropped 'memory'. |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
Full Idea: In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents, components, or parts of thoughts. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.3) | |
A reaction: My instincts are against this. I take the fundamentals of concepts to be mental responses to distinct individual items in the world. Thought builds up from that. He says psychologists themselves don't see it this way. Influence of Frege. |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
Full Idea: A philosophical theory of concepts is a semantic theory for our propositional attitudes: it explains how our thoughts can have the content they have. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is what I am interested in. I want to know in what way concepts form a bridge between content and world. I am more interested in the propositions, and less interested in our attitudes towards them. |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists use 'concept' interchangeably with 'mental representation', 'category representation', 'knowledge representation', 'knowledge structure', 'semantic representation', and 'conceptual structures'. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Machery gives references for each of these] Machery is moving in to attack these, but we look to psychologists to give some sort of account of what a concept might consist of, such that it could be implemented by neurons. |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychological theories of concepts try to describe the knowledge stored in concepts, the format of concepts, the cognitive processes that use the concepts, the acquisition of concepts, and the localization of concepts in the brain. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suppose it would the first two that are of central interest. What individuates a concept (its 'format') and what are the contents of a concept. The word 'stored' seems to imply a mental files view. |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
Full Idea: In psychology, concepts are characterized as those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and used most higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Machery mounts an attack on this idea. I like the 'mental files' idea, where a concept starts as a label, and then acquires core knowledge, and then further information. The 'concept' is probably no more than a label, and minimal starter information. |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists often use 'concept' and 'category' interchangeably. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Well they shouldn't. Some concepts are no more than words, and don't categorise anything. Some things may be categorised by a complex set of concepts. |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
Full Idea: Several concepts, such as OBJECT or AGENT, may be innate. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.4) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to say that we respond to objects and agents, and another to say that we have those 'concepts'. Presumably birds, and even bees, have to relate to similar features. Add PROCESS? |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
Full Idea: One hybrid theory of concepts says they have both a core and an identification procedure. The core is a definition (necessary and sufficient conditions), while the identification procedure consists of a prototype (the properties typical of a category). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: This combines the classical and prototype theories of concepts. I like it because it fits the idea of 'mental files' nicely (see Recanati). If concepts are files (as in a database) they will have aspects like labels, basic info, and further details. |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
Full Idea: The Heterogeneity Hypothesis, but not the hybrid theory of concepts, predicts that the coreferential bodies of knowledge it posits will occasionally lead to conflicting outcomes, such as inconsistent judgements. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.2) | |
A reaction: Machery's book champions the Heterogeneous Hypothesis. Hybrid views say the aspects of a concept are integrated, but Heterogeneity says there are separate processes. My preferred 'file' approach would favour integration. |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
Full Idea: Since the rejection of the classical theory of concepts (that they are definitions), three paradigms have successively emerged in the psychology of concepts: the prototype paradigm, the exemplar paradigm, and the theory paradigm. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I am becoming a fan of the 'theory theory' proposal, because the concepts centre around what explains the phenomenon, which fits my explanatory account of essentialism. Not that it's right because it agrees with me, of course..... |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
Full Idea: We ought to reserve the term 'concept' for the bodies of knowledge in working memory, and not for our knowledge of long-term memory, because the former, and not the latter, 'control behaviour'. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites the psychologist Barsalou 1993] Some more theoretical concepts can only be recalled with difficulty, and control our theorising rather than our behaviour. But we act on some theories, so there is no clear borderline. |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Across domains (such as biology and psychology) classes of physical objects, substances and events are typically represented by a prototype, by a set of exemplars, and by a theory. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.2.3) | |
A reaction: In other words he thinks that all of the major psychological theories of concepts are partially correct, and he argues for extensive pluralism in the true picture. Bad news for neat philosophy, but real life is a right old mess. |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
Full Idea: For many categories there is simply no definition to learn (such as Wittgenstein's example of a 'game'). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.4) |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
Full Idea: The nail in the coffin of the classical theory is its lack of explanatory power. For example it doesn't explain the fact that typical x's are categorised more quickly and more reliably than atypical x's. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Rosch and Mervis: 1975:ch 5] This research launched the 'prototype' theory, which has since been challenged by the 'exemplar' and 'theory theory' rivals (and neo-empiricism, and idealisation). |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a concept is defined by means of another, such as MURDER by means of KILL, then processing the former concept should take longer in the classical theory, but several experiments show that this is not the case. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.3) | |
A reaction: For the philosopher there is no escaping the findings of neuroscience when it comes to the study of concepts. This invites the question of the role, if any, of philosophy. I take philosophy to concern the big picture, or it is nothing. |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
Full Idea: Knowing which properties are typical of a class is particularly useful when you have to draw inductions about the members of a class. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.1) |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
Full Idea: The term 'prototype' is used ambiguously to designate the most typical members of a category, and the representation of a category. (I use the term in the second sense). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.1 n25) |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
Full Idea: The most important property of prototype theories is that cognitive processes are assumed to involve the computation of the similarity between prototypes and other representations. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites J.A.Hampton 1998, 2006] This presumably suits theories of the mind as largely computational (e.g. Fodor's account, based on the Turing machine). |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
Full Idea: We are typically not told how prototypes are selected, that is, what determines whether a specific prototype is retrieved from memory in order to be involved in the categorisation process. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.4) | |
A reaction: One of the aims of this database is to make people aware of ideas that people have already thought of. This one was spotted 2,400 years ago. It's the Third Man problem. How do you even start to think about a particular thing? |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
Full Idea: Barsalou (1983,1985) introduced the idea of ideals instead of prototypes. An ideal is a body of knowledge about the properties a thing should possess (rather than its typical actual properties). ... A 'bully' might be perfect, rather than typical. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.5.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Machery offers this as an interesting minor variant, with little experimental support. I take idealisation to be one of the three key mental operations that enable us to think about the world (along with abstraction and generalisation). |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
Full Idea: Instead of regularly producing a prototype out of the exemplars stored in long-term memory, it seems more efficient to extract a prototype from category members during concept learning and to use this prototype when needed. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.3.2) | |
A reaction: [This is a critique of Barsalou's on-the-fly proposal for prototypes] If the exemplar theory is right, then some sort of summary must occur when faced with a new instance. So this thought favours prototypes against exemplars. |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
Full Idea: The prototype paradigm of concepts makes the strong prediction that typical members should be easier to categorise than atypical members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.4.1) | |
A reaction: This is why philosophers should approach the topic of concepts with caution. Clearly empirical testing is going to settle this matter, not abstract theorising. |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
Full Idea: The exemplar paradigm of concepts is built around the idea that concepts are sets of exemplars. In turn, an exemplar is a body of knowledge about the properties believed to be possessed by a particular member of a class. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: I like the fact that this theory is rooted in particulars, where the prototype theory doesn't seem to say much about how prototypes are derived. But you have to do more than just contemplate a bunch of exemplars. |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
Full Idea: Exemplar theories have a selection problem. Given that individuals have an infinite number of properties, they need to explain why exemplars represent such and such properties, instead of others. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that this idea rests on the 'abundant' view of properties - that every true predicate embodies a property. A sparse view of properties might give a particular quite a restricted set of properties. |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
Full Idea: An object that is extremely similar to a specific known category member, but only moderately similar to others, is more likely to be categorised as a category member than an object that is moderately similar to most known category members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.3) | |
A reaction: This research finding is a problem for the Exemplar Theory, in which all the exemplars have equal status. It is even a problem for the Prototype Theory, since the known member may not be like the prototype. |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
Full Idea: The theory paradigm is sometimes called 'the knowledge approach' (Murphy 2002) or 'explanation-based views' (Komatsu 1992). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The word 'explanation' is music to my ears, so I am immediately sympathetic to the theory theory of concepts, even if it falls at the final hurdle. |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
Full Idea: According to theory theorists, a concept of a category stores some knowledge that can explain the properties of the category members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: This is the account of essentialism which I defended in my PhD thesis. So naturally I embrace a theory of the nature of concepts which precisely dovetails with my view. I take explanation to be the central concept in metaphysics. |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
Full Idea: The two core ideas of the Theory Theory are that concepts are bodies of knowledge that underlie explanation, where explanation rests on folk examples, and concepts are organised in domains which use similar knowledge. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: Folk explanation is opposed to scientific explanation, as expounded by Hempel etc. This sounds better and better, since the domains reflect the structure of reality. Machery defends Theory Theory as part of the right answer, but it's my favourite bit. |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
Full Idea: Theory theorists deny that categorisation depends on similarity; they often propose that categorisation involves some kind of inference to the best explanation. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.5.1) | |
A reaction: Love it. Any theory of concepts should, in my view, be continuous with a plausible account of animal minds, and best explanations are not their strong suit. Maybe its explanations for slow categorising, and something else when it's quick. |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
Full Idea: It seems that when subjects are not categorising by similarity, they are relying on what properties objects can and cannot have - that is, on some modal knowledge. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.5.1) | |
A reaction: I would call this essentialist categorisation, based on the inner causal powers which generate the modal profile of the thing. We categorise bullets and nails very differently, because of their modal profiles. |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a prototype of grandmothers represents them as grey-haired old women, and a definition of grandmothers represents them as being necessarily the mother of a parent ....we may fail to recognise that 'grandmother' represents two distinct concepts. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.4) | |
A reaction: He is referring to two distinct theories about what a concept is. He argues that both theories apply, so words do indeed represent several different concepts. Nice example. |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
Full Idea: Behaviourists identified concepts with a mere disposition to associate category members with a given name. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is one reason why the word 'disposition' triggers alarm bells in the immediately post-behaviourist generation of philosophers. The proposal is far too linguistic in character. |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
Full Idea: Tests suggest that American subjects were significantly more likely than Chinese subjects to have intuitions in line with causal-historical theories of reference. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.1.3) | |
A reaction: This is an example of 'experimental philosophy' in action (of which Machery is a champion). The underlying idea is that Americans are generally more disposed to think causally than the Chinese are. So more scientific? What do the Hopi do? |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
Full Idea: Surely happiness is what everyone wants, so much so that there can be none who do not want it? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.20) | |
A reaction: His concept of happiness is, of course, religious. Occasionally you meet habitual grumblers about life who give the impression that they are only happy when they are discontented. So happiness is achieving desires, not feeling good? |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. …One set of private interests would check another set of private interests. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who think a completely free market will evolve into a flourishing and just society. There is a basic debate about the importance of the character of the citizens in any polity. Marxists say they are entangled. |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Galston says responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtue: general (law-abiding, loyal), social (independent, open-minded), economic (diligent, restrained, adaptable), and political (respect, sensible, judgement, engagement). | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: [Galston's 'Liberal Purposes' 1991] (compressed) This immediately seems to be asking too much, especially for those who know little, or are short of money. |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: To defend Aristotelian republicanism it is not enough to show that individual require society - liberals do not deny this. They must also show that individuals need to be politically active. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. People are not just inactive because they have been rendered powerless. In any group of people there are some who are keen to have a voice, or lead, and others who are largely happy to follow. |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Minimal citizenship is often seen as simply requiring non-interference with others, but that ignores a basic requirement of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: He makes the point that the minimal requirement has to be given up when there is a crisis, which needs much more involvement. This largely describes modern Britain, prior to the Brexit rift. |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society …involves a radical extension of the obligations of liberal citizenship. The obligation to treat people as equal citizens now applies to everyday decisions. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: This is very difficult for an older generation who felt their 'entitlement' as leading citizens, or who routinely favoured their local traditional community. But they just have to 'get over it'! |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: According to the New Right, to promote active citizenship-for-all or entitlements, we must focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Every creature has to earn a living, but one method is to successfully sponge off others. A cushy job is a sort of sponging. An excessively well paid job is a sort of sponging. Citizenship must involve responsibilities of some sort. |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Modern discussion has shifted from 'vote-centric' (or 'aggregative') to 'talk-centric' democracy. The vote-centric model has no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that a person's preferences betweent these two is a reflection of character, or basic attitudes to morality. Some people think democratically about their relationships, and others very obviously don't. |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: A liberal-democratic system is one in which those people who are subject to political authority have a right to participate in determining that authority. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: This applies to immigrants. The most anti-democratic move in recent democracies is the strategy of trying to make it more difficult to vote, perhaps by demanding identification documents, or creating huge queues. |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but the enrichment of private life. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Perhaps a sentiment expected more from a university lecturer than from a poorly-paid labourer. Does he mean watching innumerable TV shows instead of having sing-songs in the local pub? Increased leisure is indisputable. |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures that have preferred status. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This becomes tricky in schools, where the old way of teaching national literature and particular types of music has been eroded in modern times. But once wide diversity is allowed there is no single story which can be taught. |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberals need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect', and recognise the central role of nation-building in a democracy. …This means promoting a common language, and equal access to institutions operating in that language. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
A reaction: 'Benign neglect' is non-interference with citizens' lives. Obviously the institutions include education, but is a state health service implied? Can equal access by guaranteed to private institutions? |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: On the view of 'differentiated citizenship', members of certain groups would be incorporated into the community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights would depend in part on their group membership. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: This is obviously a strategy to enable marginalised individuals to be fully included in society. The downside is that individuals gain their social identity through a label, rather than through themselves, which pure liberals dislike. 'Identity politics'. |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The evidence suggests that (contrary to the Marxist view) the status hierarchy is not reducible to the economic hierarchy. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka is particularly thinking of racism, which lowers the status of certain groups, even if they are economically successful. I console myself for my modest economic status by getting lots of education. |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Defending multiculturalism initially involved endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, and viewed minority rights as defending cohesive minority groups against the encroachment of liberal individualism. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.1) | |
A reaction: Liberal individualists have to accept these criticisms from Marxists, communitarians and multiculturalists. The lone individual has no group that guarantees support, and individuals (especially the young) can easily sink. |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The 'liberal culturalist' position is that minorities which share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Disabled liberals are an obvious example. This strikes me as a promising version of liberalism, which accepts the criticisms of extreme individualism. |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Many feminists express concern that multiculturalism in practice typically means giving male members of the group the power to control the women in the group. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: The way the young are treated might also be a problem. The underlying question is whether the minority group is more or less civilised than the central state. Liberalism always fights for the rights of the least powerful. |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal defenders of multiculturalism must distinguish 'bad' minority rights which are restrictions from 'good' minority rights which supplement individual rights. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably no sensible liberal wants to remove all restrictions, so deeper values must be invoked to justify the mode of approved minority rights. A list of human goods seems needed. |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Why should national minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the majority? | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
A reaction: A 'national minority' is marked by a different language, or a different religion, or both. No one doubts the majority's right to nation-build. Some further principle would be needed to deny that right to a minority. Maybe the minority was there first? |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Liberal multiculturalism challenges status inequalities while preserving individual freedom. …Conservative multiculturalism replaces liberal principles with a communitarian politics of the common good, at least at the local or group level. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sounds a bit simplistic. Recent emphasis on 'the common good', in the face of white supremacists etc., seems admirable, but surely challenging inequalities promotes the common good? Minority cultures are often conservative. |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
Full Idea: Some artifacts are the objects of inquiry in the social sciences ...such as prehistoric tools ...and hence, artifacts are bona fide natural kinds. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably if a bird's nest can be a natural kind, then so can a flint axe, but then so can a mobile phone, for an urban anthropologist. 'Natural' is, to put it mildly, a tricky word. |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I begin to wonder whether time is an extension of the mind itself. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.26) | |
A reaction: The observation that the mind creates a 'specious present' (spreading experience out over a short fraction of second) reinforces this. Personally I like David Marshall's proposal that consciousness is entirely memory, which would deny this idea. |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Augustine answers that for us to be aware of time it must exist only in the mind, …and the difference between past and future is just the difference between memory and anticipation. | |
From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
A reaction: This is an extreme idealist view. Are we to say that the past consists only of what can be remembered, and the future only of what is anticipated? Absurd anti-realism, in my view. Where do his concepts come from, asks Le Poidevin. |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: A short time ago or a short time ahead we might put at ten days, but how can anything which does not exist be either long or short? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
A reaction: A nice question, which gets at the paradoxical nature of time very nicely. How can it be long, but non-existent? We could break the paradox by concluding '..and therefore time does exist', even though we can't see how. |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: Of the three divisions of time, how can two, the past and the future, be, when the past no longer is, and the future is not yet? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
A reaction: This is the oldest bewilderment about time, which naturally leads us to the thought that time cannot actually 'exist'. The remark implies that at least 'now' is safe, but that also succumbs to paradox pretty quickly. |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: We cannot say that the whole of the current year is present, and if the whole of it is not present, the year is not present. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
A reaction: Another nice way of presenting the paradox of time. We are in a particular year, so it has to be real. |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I know well enough what time is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
A reaction: A justly famous remark, even though it adds nothing to our knowledge of time. This sort of thought pushes us towards accepting many things as axiomatic, such as time, space, identity, persons, mind. |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I once heard a learned man say that time is nothing but the movement of the sun and the moon and the stars, but I do not agree. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.22) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say that you either take time or movement as axiomatic, and describe one in terms of the other, but you are stuck unable to give the initial statement of the axiom without mentioning the second property you were saving for later. |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The fact that heaven and earth are there proclaims that they were created, for they are subject to change and variation; ..the meaning of change and variation is that something is there which was not there before. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.04) | |
A reaction: It seems possible that the underlying matter is eternal (as in various conservation laws, such as that of energy), and that all change is in the form rather than the substance. |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: If nothing existed by God before creation, then what could have happened to, or within, God that led God to decide to create the universe at that particular moment? Why would an eternal or perfect being want or need to change? | |
From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
A reaction: I suppose you could reply that change is superior to stasis, but then why did God delay the creation? |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: O Lord, since you are outside time in eternity, are you unaware of the things that I tell you? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.01) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the single most difficult and most elusive question about the nature of a supreme divine being. If the being is trapped in time, as we are, it is greatly diminished, and if it is outside, it is hard to see how it could be a participant. |