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All the ideas for 'works', 'Action' and 'The Ways of Paradox'

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30 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each proposed revision of set theory is unnatural, because the natural scheme is the unrestricted one that the antinomies discredit.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.16)
     A reaction: You can either takes this free-far-all version of set theory, and gradually restrain it for each specific problem, or start from scratch and build up in safe steps. The latter is (I think) the 'iterated' approach.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
     Full Idea: In the case of Russell's antinomy, the tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning that is found wanting is this: for any condition you can formulate, there is a class whose members are the things meeting the condition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.11)
     A reaction: This is why Russell's Paradox is so important for set theory, which in turn makes it important for the foundations of mathematics.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
     Full Idea: An 'antinomy' produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.05)
     A reaction: Quine treats antinomies as of much greater importance than mere paradoxes. It is often possible to give simple explanations of paradoxes, but antinomies go to the root of our belief system. This was presumably Kant's intended meaning.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Achilles argument is that (if the front runner keeps running) each time the pursuer reaches a spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved a bit beyond.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.03)
     A reaction: Quine is always wonderfully lucid, and this is the clearest simple statement of the paradox.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
     Full Idea: In a certain village there is a barber, who shaves all and only those men in the village who do not shave themselves. So does the barber shave himself? The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.02)
     A reaction: [Russell himself quoted this version of his paradox, from an unnamed source] Quine treats his as trivial because it only concerns barbers, but the full Russell paradox is a major 'antinomy', because it concerns sets.
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
     Full Idea: With Russell's antinomy, ...each tie the trouble comes of taking a membership condition that itself talks in turn of membership and non-membership.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.13)
     A reaction: Hence various stipulations to rule out vicious circles or referring to sets of the 'wrong type' are invoked to cure the problem. The big question is how strong to make the restrictions.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
     Full Idea: If we supplant the sentence 'this sentence is false' with one saying what it refers to, we get '"this sentence is false" is false'. But then the whole outside sentence attributes falsity no longer to itself but to something else, so there is no paradox.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.07)
     A reaction: Quine is pointing us towards type theory and meta-languages to solve the problem. We now have the Revenge Liar, and the problem has not been fully settled.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Augustine says bodies don't form images in our spirit; our spirit does that itself with amazing quickness. ...So the appearances under which mind knows things aren't drawn from the things themselves.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Thomas Aquinas - Quodlibeta 8.2.1
     A reaction: This is Augustine's theory of 'illumination' - that God creates experience within us. His theory was soon discarded by the early scholastics.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Instead of supposing that what we know can be abstracted from sensible particulars that instantiate such knowledge, Augustine insists that our mind is so constituted as to see 'intelligible realities' directly by inner illumination.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: His 'theory of illumination'. This seems to be a sort of super-rationalism. This doesn't make clear the role of sensations. Surely he doesn't thing that we just bypass them?
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1)
     A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
     A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics.
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
     A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right.
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action.
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4)
     A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk.
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: The modern concept of the will is often said to originate with Augustine.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that this is the source of the trouble. How can a thing be intrinsically free? Surely freedom is always a contextual concept?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief.
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version.
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that).
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3)
     A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear.
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
     Full Idea: Love, and do what you will.
     From: Augustine (works [c.415])
     A reaction: This sounds libertarian, but Augustine had a stern concept of what love required. It nicely captures one of the essential ideas of virtue ethics.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Augustine claimed that the pagan schools between them had produced nearly three hundred different definitions of the highest good.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5
     A reaction: I would expect the right definition to be in there somewhere, but no doubt Augustine's definition made it 301. Perhaps the biggest problem of human life is that (as with the Kennedy assassination) proliferating stories obscure the true story.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Augustine insisted that 'ought' does not, in any straightforward way, imply 'can' - which distinguishes him from most modern ethicists.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: Not unreasonable. I ought to help my ailing friend who lives abroad, but I haven't the time or money to do it. We can experience impossibilities as duties. Impossibilities are just excuses. Augustine is opposing the Pelagian heresy.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Augustine did the most to define Christian heresy. The three most prominent were Donatism, Pelagianism (that humans are perfectible), and Manicheism (that good and evil are equally basic metaphysical realities).
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.73
     A reaction: Manicheans had presumably been studying Empedocles. (I suppose it's too late to identify Christianity as a heresy?).
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]
     Full Idea: Augustine solution to the problem of evil was to say that, strictly speaking, evil does not exist. Human beings are not part evil and part good, but rather just a limited amount of goodness.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: Augustine was rebelling against Manicheanism, which he espoused when young, which proposed a good and an evil force. An apathetic slob seems devoid of goodness, but is not evil. It takes extra effort to perform active evil.