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All the ideas for 'works', 'works' and 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
17743 De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3448 Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]
     Full Idea: If someone gives you a piece of information, does your brain suddenly become heavier?
     From: Adam Dance (works [2001]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple question, which is a reductio of the idea that information is simply a physical object. The question points to a functionalist account of brain activity.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.