Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Introduction to German Philosophy' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
     A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The early German Romantics argued that art pointed to a more all-inclusive conception of reason, which can offer ways of articulating what is not conceptually accessible.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 5 'Reason')
     A reaction: [This is Novalis, F.Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin] I'm in favour of expanding reason, to include assessment of situations and coherence, rather than just stepwise reasoning. Not sure that art 'articulates' something new.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
     A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie]
     Full Idea: German Idealism aims to demonstrate that our thinking relates to a nature which is intelligibly structured in the same way as our thinking is structured.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 3 'Limits')
     A reaction: Now that's an idealism I might buy into. Frege thought his logic was mapping rational reality. My angle is that we are a product of this 'reality', so we should expect our thinking to be similarly structured. Reason is derived from nature.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
     A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The Nazi idea is that the self is predetermined primarily by its race.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect that I occasionally encounter this view, in very patriotic people. But then you meet people who feeling that their self is mainly determined by support of a football team. Note, though, 'pre-'determined. Hegel makes this idea possible?
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The attempt to rid philosophy of rhetoric falls prey precisely to that fact that what is involved in rhetoric is inherent in what is built into all natural languages by their genesis in the real historical world.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 2 'Hamann')
     A reaction: Rhetoric can range from charming to bullying, and it is the latter which is the problem. The underlying issue is dogma versus dialectic. Some analytic philosophers have a good shot at being non-rhetorical.