8 ideas
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'. | |
From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1 | |
A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'. |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3 | |
A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper. |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle. |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion. |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238) | |
A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct. |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics. |