6 ideas
| 17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'. | |
| From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'. |
| 17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
| Full Idea: There is evidence that the concept of causation is innate, or that we are primed to acquire it very early in life, within months at most. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167) | |
| A reaction: Bird doesn't give any references. This is important for our understanding of induction. Creatures seem to learn from a single instance, rather than waiting for habit to be ingrained by many instances. They must infer a cause. |
| 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3 | |
| A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion! |
| 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2 | |
| A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects. |
| 17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The analysis of causation in terms of dispositions provides no conceptual reduction, but it does provide insight into the metaphysics of causation. We then know what causation is - it is the stimulation and manifestation of a disposition. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167) | |
| A reaction: I would say that it offers the essence of causation, by giving a basic explanation of it. See Mumford/Lill Anjum on this. |
| 17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and condition, ...but when the smoke sets off the fire alarm, the smoke is the cause, whereas the presence of the alarm is just the condition. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.162) | |
| A reaction: Bird defends the idea that causes are what stimulate dispositions to act. |