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All the ideas for 'works', 'Summa' and 'Frege on Apriority (with ps)'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
     Full Idea: Geometrical concepts appear to depend in some way on a spatial ability. Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of the propositions seems to me to be thereby lost.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 4)
     A reaction: I think this is a widely held view nowadays. Giaquinto has a book on it. A successful model of something can't replace it. Set theory can't replace arithmetic.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
     Full Idea: In the Peano axiomatisation, arithmetic seems primitively to involve the thought that 0 is a number.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 5)
     A reaction: Burge is pointing this out as a problem for Frege, for whom only the logic is primitive.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
     A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
     Full Idea: Whereas Leibniz and Frege predicate apriority primarily of truths (or more fundamentally, proofs of truths), Kant predicates apriority primarily of cognition and the employment of representations.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 1)