11 ideas
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason. |
| 17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
| Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'. | |
| From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'. |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek. |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time. |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles') | |
| A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism? |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's') | |
| A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge? |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
| A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check? |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132). |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
| A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule? |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question. |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him? | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
| A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality. |