Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Conditionals and Possibilia' and 'talk'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Jackson defends the truth-functional account by saying that for a conditional to be assertable, it must not only be believed that its truth-conditions are satisfied, but the belief must be robust or resilient with respect to the antecedent.
     From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals and Possibilia [1981]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 4
     A reaction: ..That is, one would not abandon the conditional if one believed the antecedent to be true.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]
     Full Idea: A common modern reductive view of the mind is that a hierarchy of intentional systems eventually produce qualia, but it might be the other way around. The mind is 'qualia-upon-qualia', with units of minimal qualia building up into intentional thought.
     From: Harry Gildersleve (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: If qualia are seen as existing at the most basic level of the brain, this may well imply panpsychism. It certainly says that basic brain cells are capable of minimal experiences. The idea that thought is essentially qualitative is very intriguing.