Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'New system of communication of substances' and 'The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification

17743	De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
	Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
	From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
	A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13168	My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science.

13169	I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

13170	The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
	A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13171	Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144)
	A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

8824	No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
	Full Idea: I know of no serious defence of 'translational phenomenalism' since Ayer's in 1940.
	From: report of A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? 303-4+n
	A reaction: We can think of Ayer as a hero who explored how far extreme empiricism would go. We still have anti-realists who are singing from a revised version of the song-sheet. Personally I am with Russell, that we must embrace the best explanation.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

15251	The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
	Full Idea: How are we to explain the word 'must' [about causation]? The answer is, I think, that it is either a relic of animism, or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connexion as if it were a form of logical necessity.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940], IV.18)
	A reaction: The animism proposal just about makes sense (as a primitive feature of minds), but why would anyone, if they had the time and understanding, dream of treating a regular connection as a 'logical' necessity?

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13167	We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.