23655
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An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
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Full Idea:
It is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits, …for he must then be guilty of an inconsistency.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
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A reaction:
Good point. You can't divorce 'pure' reason from the reasoners, because the inconsistency of two propositions only matters when they are both asserted together. …But attacking the ideas isn't quite the same as attacking the person.
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23659
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If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious of it, I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may pity him, but I cannot reason the matter with him.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 5)
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A reaction:
An example of the influence of Descartes' Cogito running through all subsequent European philosophy. There remain the usual questions about personal identity which then arise, but Reid addresses those.
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23654
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In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
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Full Idea:
In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
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A reaction:
Wishful thinking in the 21st century, when the many routinely deny the authority of the expert few, and the expert few occasionally prove that the collective common sense of the many is delusional. I still sort of agree with Reid.
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23653
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If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If you perceive an object, white, round, and a foot in diameter, if you had not been able to distinguish the colour from the figure, and both from the magnitude, your senses would only give you one complex and confused notion of all these mingled together
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 1)
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A reaction:
His point is that if you reject the 'abstraction' of these qualities, you still cannot deny that distinguishing them is an essential aspect of perceiving complex things. Does this mean that animals distinguish such things?
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4125
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Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
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From:
report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.
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4126
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If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?
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4127
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If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
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Full Idea:
If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
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From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
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A reaction:
Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.
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22483
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A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
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Full Idea:
We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
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From:
Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
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A reaction:
Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.
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