|
20621
|
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying'
|
|
A reaction:
It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1).
|
|
21248
|
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
|
|
A reaction:
A classic example of turning the tables, also applicable to anyone who firmly denies knowledge, or that words are meaningful, or says that meaning needs verification. However, one measily truth is not much consolation.
|
|
15812
|
Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly the notion of multitude.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I Q11 ar2 ad4), quoted by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 1.5
|
|
A reaction:
This is one of the best things I have read on 'being'. It is the Aristotelian recognition that we can only study being by studying identity, and that this leads on to wider metaphysics. Other approaches to being are dead ends.
|
|
21268
|
Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
All natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore God does not exist.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2)
|
|
A reaction:
Not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. So the possibility of naturalism (assuming the human will can be further reduced to nature) was a clear option in the thirteenth century. In reply Aquinas cites his Fifth Way.
|
|
17954
|
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
|
|
Full Idea:
Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ.
|
|
From:
Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time).
|
|
16765
|
Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
A human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, and all lower forms, and it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia Q76 4c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.1
|
|
A reaction:
He says brutes and plants also have a single soul. Pasnau says this is Aquinas's most distinctive doctrine, because other thinkers postulate a whole hierarchy of substantial forms.
|
|
23175
|
The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain.
|
|
21337
|
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1)
|
|
A reaction:
[Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'.
|
|
21249
|
Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other hand, self-evident in itself, and to us.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
|
|
A reaction:
A clear distinction, which is hard to deny, though there are lots of borderline cases. Self-evident to genius, and self-evident to future genius. Self-evident to almost everyone. Goldbach's Conjecture may be self-evident but unknowable.
|
|
20224
|
Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension, for these prepare the way to intellectual knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues by which we know truth; these are in the intellect or reason.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q56 a5 obj3), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind III 2.2
|
|
A reaction:
A gem of a quotation for Zagzebski's thesis, that knowledge is defined in terms of the intellectual virtues. The only virtues of perception are in focusing and paying attention to features. Good eyesight is a biological 'virtue', I suppose.
|
|
22107
|
Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
|
|
Full Idea:
Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience.
|
|
9092
|
Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
|
|
A reaction:
Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality.
|
|
9093
|
We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
|
|
A reaction:
This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities?
|
|
9095
|
Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
|
|
A reaction:
The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level.
|
|
9099
|
Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary.
|
|
9152
|
If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
In traditional abstraction, the colour green merely has the intrinsic property of being green, other properties of things being abstracted away. But why should that be regarded as a type? It must be because the property is common to the instances.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §5)
|
|
A reaction:
A nice question which shows that the much-derided single act of abstraction is not sufficient to arrive at a concept, so that abstraction is a more complex matter (perhaps even a rational one) than simple empiricists believe.
|
|
22111
|
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12
|
|
A reaction:
This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual?
|
|
22105
|
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is necessary to say that that which is the principle of intellective activity, what we call the soul of a human being, is an incorporeal, subsistent principle.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q75 2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10
|
|
A reaction:
Note 'subsistent' rather than 'existent' (capable of independence?). This identifies the immortal soul with the conscious mind. 'Principle' is an odd word, presumably with roots in Aristotle. It seems to be an Aristotelian 'form' [morphe].
|
|
22108
|
First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
The intellect first apprehends the quiddity of a thing. ...Then it acquires the properties, accidents and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. It must proceed from one compounding or dividing of aspects to another, which is reasoning.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia.Q85 5c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] Tracking the process of acquiring knowledge of a thing (rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for full knowledge) is closer to Quine's naturalised epistemology than to the standard analytic approach to the concept of knowledge.
|
|
10504
|
Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Abstracting takes place in two ways: by composition and division, understanding something to be not in another or to be separated from it; and by a simple and unconditioned consideration, understanding one thing while not considering the other at all.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 1 Ad 1)
|
|
A reaction:
The second way is by 'ignoring', which he says cannot contain error. The first seems to be considering some mode of a thing to be actually separate from the thing, which could clearly be erroneous. Ignoring makes to commitment to a unity.
|
|
9146
|
After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Cantor's abstractionist account there can only be two numbers, 0 and 1. For abs(Socrates) = abs(Plato), since their numbers are the same. So the number of {Socrates,Plato} is {abs(Soc),abs(Plato)}, which is the same number as {Socrates}!
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
Fine tries to answer this objection, which arises from §45 of Frege's Grundlagen. Fine summarises that "indistinguishability without identity appears to be impossible". Maybe we should drop talk of numbers in terms of sets.
|
|
8009
|
Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre]
|
|
Full Idea:
The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9
|
|
A reaction:
This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance).
|
|
23182
|
Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
There must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good, and this virtue is legal justice.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q58 6)
|
|
A reaction:
This concept of legal justice is underpinned, for Aquinas, by the concept of natural law, which has divine backing. Positive law could hardly fulfil such a major role, given that it could be corrupt.
|
|
23177
|
Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are 'adjusted' when they are made equal.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 1)
|
|
A reaction:
Even if you say justice is giving people what they deserve, rather than mere equality, they must still be equal in receiving like for like. Legal justice implies equality before the law (except for monarchs?).
|
|
23179
|
People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are many differences of degrees among men, for instance, some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be alloted to them.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 4)
|
|
A reaction:
An objection (3), but Aquinas endorses it in his reply. In 58.10 he says striking a prince is worse that striking a commoner. The shift to the idea that everyone is supposed to be equal before the law has been slow, and we are not quite there yet.
|
|
22113
|
Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
All things to be done or to be avoided pertain to the precepts of natural law, which practical reasoning apprehends naturally as being human goods.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q94.2c), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13
|
|
A reaction:
No mention of God, but you feel the divine presence in the background. He also cites 'eternal law'. No coincidence that the atheist Hobbes rejected natural law. Personally I would offer an atheistic defence of natural law, based on human nature.
|
|
22114
|
Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not unconditionally a law, but is rather a perversion of law.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 13
|
|
A reaction:
Only a belief in natural law can give a basis for such a claim. Positivists will say a tyrannical law is unconditionally a law like any other, but a bad one.
|
|
7291
|
For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aquinas argued that on three conditions war can be justified: first, that there is a just cause; second, that it is begun on proper authority; and third, that it is waged with right intention, for 'the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil'.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II) by A.C. Grayling - Among the Dead Cities Ch.6
|
|
A reaction:
But see also Idea 7292. Nowadays we are rightly suspicious of all three conditions. Evil people seem to think their cause is just; authority has often been seized by violence, or is being abused; and people seem confused about what is good or evil.
|
|
5508
|
Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Aquinas's view the fertilized egg is not, either at the moment of conception or for quite a while afterwards, endowed with an immortal soul. In fact, technically speaking, it is not even human.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.20
|
|
A reaction:
It is pointed at that therefore Aquinas does not give good support for modern Catholic views on abortion. There is certainly no reason why a human zygote should be ensouled from the start, as God may do this whenever He wishes.
|
|
21269
|
Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of).
|
|
21270
|
Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation.
|
|
21271
|
Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)?
|
|
21272
|
Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections.
|
|
21273
|
Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success.
|
|
22106
|
Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
|
|
Full Idea:
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas does not think that there is a 'spiritual matter' that angels or disembodied souls have as one of their components, but rather that they are separated forms that configure no matter at all.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 10
|
|
A reaction:
'Separated forms' sounds like the modern concept of abstract entities, meaning that souls and angels exist in the way that platonists believe numbers exist. How else might Aquinas have understood them?
|
|
23306
|
Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji]
|
|
Full Idea:
Aquinas infers from Aristotle that intellectual understanding is the only operation of the soul that is performed without a physical organ, so that only human souls, and not animal ones, can be immortal.
|
|
From:
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I, q75, a3, resp) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Reason'
|
|
A reaction:
This shows why so many thinkers are desperate to hang on to dualism, of some sort. Interesting that he only claims partial dualism.
|
|
21266
|
God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
If one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name God means that He is infinite goodness. If therefore God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1)
|
|
A reaction:
This is not, of course, the opinion of Aquinas. I love the way he states the opposition's arguments so lucidly. The modern problem usually talks of God's omnipotence, rather than infinity. His formulation allows that there might be undiscoverable evil.
|
|
21274
|
It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas]
|
|
Full Idea:
As Augustine says, God would not allow any evil to exist in his works, unless he were to bring good even out of evil. It is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He allows evil to exist and out of it produces good.
|
|
From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep)
|
|
A reaction:
Are God's powers so limited that He could not have achieved an equal amount of good without having to indulge in some evil first?
|