10 ideas
18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with. | |
From: Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1 | |
A reaction: Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory. |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time). |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: I can understand the notion of real definition as applying to (some) abstact entities, but I have no idea how to apply it to a concrete object such as Socrates or myself. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: She is objecting to Kit Fine's account of essence, which is meant to be clearer than the normal account of essences based on necessities. Aristotle implies that definitions get fuzzy when you reach the level of the individual. |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The modal account was meant, I take it, to make the notion of essence less mysterious by basing it on the supposedly better understood notion of necessity. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We support the views of metaphysical modality on which metaphysical necessity is an even more deeply empirical matter than Kripke has argued. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], p.2) | |
A reaction: [co-author E. Viebahn] This seems to pinpoint the spirit of scientific essentialism. She cites Bird and Shoemaker. If it is empirical, doesn't that make it a matter of epistemology, and hence further from absolute necessity? |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The apparatus of possible worlds affords greater expressive power than mere talk of possibility and necessity. In particular, possible worlds talk allows us to introduce degrees of possibility. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: A nice feature, but I'm not sure that either the proportion of possible worlds or the closeness of possible worlds captures what we actually mean by a certain degree of possibility. There is 'accidental closeness', or absence of contingency. See Vetter. |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should look at the claim that possibility is constituted by potentiality. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A problem that comes to mind is possibilities arising from coincidence. The whole of reality must be described, to capture all the possibilities for a particular thing. So potentialities of what? Nice thought, though. |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Some of what metaphysicians take to be metaphysically possible turns out to be only epistemically possible. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice clear expression of the increasingly common view that conceivability may be a limited way to grasp possibility. |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The closeness of possible worlds should be determined by similarity in the intrinsic constitution of whatever object it is whose potentialities are at issue. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Nice thought. This seems to be the essentialist approach to possible worlds, but it makes the natures of the objects more fundamental than the framework of the worlds. She demurs because there are also extrinsic potentialities. |
15313 | By 'force' I mean the sources of all actions - sometimes called 'powers' by their outcomes [Breheny] |
Full Idea: I mean by the word 'force' the source or sources of all possible actions of the particles or materials of the universe: these being often called the powers of nature when spoken of in relation to the different manners in which their effects are shown. | |
From: Richard Breheny (Letter to Clerk Maxwell [1855]), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B | |
A reaction: He uses 'force' for what is fundamental, and 'powers' for their results. I am inclining to talk of 'fundamental powers' and 'complex powers', leaving the word 'force' to the physicists. |