11 ideas
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly. |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with. |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view. |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me. |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role. |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener. |
4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I do not attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1665?) | |
A reaction: This is clearly a statement of Hume's famous later opinion that there are no values ('ought') in nature ('is'). It is a rejection of Aristotelian and Greek teleology. It is hard to argue with, but I have strong sales resistance, rooted in virtue theory. |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |
4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I define God as a being consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or supremely perfect. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1661) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the glorious culmination of the hyperbolic conception of God that expands steadily from wood spirits through Zeus, to eventually mop up everything in nature, and then everything that can be imagined beyond nature. All very silly. |
4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Those who endeavour to establish God's existence and the truth of religion by means of miracles seek to prove the obscure by what is more obscure. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1675?) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. On the whole this has to be right, but one must leave open a possibility. If there is a God, and He seeks to prove Himself by a deed, are we saying this is impossible? Divine intervention might be the best explanation of something. |