15 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
Full Idea: For us there are four cardinal moral virtues: courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. But Aristotle and Aquinas call only three of these virtues moral virtues; practical wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) they class with the intellectual virtues. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'for us'. How many of us rank temperance as a supreme virtue? Aristotle ranks phronesis (which I think of as 'common sense') as the key enabler of the moral virtues, making it unlike the other intellectual virtues. |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
Full Idea: Knowledge that can be acquired only by someone who is clever or who has access to special training is not counted as part of wisdom. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.6) | |
A reaction: Consider Pierre's peasant friend Platon Karatayev in 'War and Peace'. I assume 'special training' rules out anyone with a philosophy degree. |
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
A reaction: Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here. |
4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letter to G.H. Schaller [1674], 1674.10) | |
A reaction: Of course, this isn't 'freedom' at all, but it seems to exactly right as an account of so-called freedom. In the case of a human being the 'necessity of our own nature' is character, and virtue and vice are the expressions of the necessities of character. |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
Full Idea: Hardly anyone sees any difficulty in the thought that virtues may sometimes be displayed in bad actions. The courage of the villain can be spoken of as quite unproblematic. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III) | |
A reaction: She cites Peter Geach as a sole opponent of this view. The courage of the entire German army in WWII seems to fall into this category. The boldness of villains has to impress the virtuous but timid. |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
Full Idea: A popular view (expressed by Philippa Foot) is that the virtues work to 'correct' for the baser human impulses and motives. …Virtues are solutions to design flaws in human beings. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978]) by Julia Driver - The Virtues and Human Nature 1 | |
A reaction: Quite a plausible thought. Not so much design flaws, though, as natural traits of character that suited hunter gatherers but not modern cosmopolitan capitalists. Driver disagrees. |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
Full Idea: Some actions are in accordance with virtue without requiring virtue for their performance, whereas others are both in accordance with virtue and such as to show possession of a virtue. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.13) | |
A reaction: She cites the case of an honest trader, who is honest because of self-interest. She is disentangling Kant from his daft idea that only dutiful (and reluctant) actions are virtuous. Kant was only thinking of 'in accordance' cases. |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
Full Idea: The virtues are corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple and accurate observation, which I don't remember meeting in Aristotle (...though she cites him as saying that virtues concern what is difficult for us). Justice and charity are given as examples of inadequate motivation. |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
Full Idea: In some people temperance is not a virtue, but is rather connected with timidity or with a grudging attitude to the acceptance of good things. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III) | |
A reaction: Timidity seems right. The grudging attitude may result from some larger doubts about pleasure, which could be plausible. |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
Full Idea: The fears that count against a man's courage are those that we think he should overcome, and among them, in a special class, those that reflect the fact that he values his safety too much. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II) | |
A reaction: I think that sentence tells us more accurately what courage is than anything in Aristotle's discussion. Ask yourself which of your fears really ought to be overcome, and particularly beware of over-valuing your own safety. But stay safe if you can! |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it? |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
A reaction: This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy. |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: The objection to Fair's view that the direction of causation is the direction of the transference of energy and/or momentum is that the concept of transference itself involves the idea of causation. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
A reaction: Does it? If a particle proceeds from a to b, how is that causation? ...But the problem is that the particle kicks open the door when it arrives (i.e. makes changes). We wouldn't call it causation if the transference didn't change any properties. |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: An early view of causation (Mill and Hume) is whatever is (ceteris paribus) sufficient for the event. A second view (E.Nagel) is that the cause should just be necessary. Some (R.Taylor) even contemplate the cause having to be necessary and sufficient. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §2) | |
A reaction: A cause can't be necessary if there is some other way to achieve the effect. A single cause is not sufficient if many other factors are also essential. If neither of those is right, then 'both' is wrong. Enter John Mackie... |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related. | |
From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1) | |
A reaction: I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either. |