11 ideas
5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Is each of us not the soul, but the chief part of the soul, by which we think and reason and act, all the other parts of soul as well as of body being mere instruments of its power? | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1119) | |
A reaction: Socrates is associated with the idea that I am my whole soul (Idea 1650). Plutarch represents an interesting development, which may lead both to the Christian 'soul' and to the Cartesian 'ego'. I think Plutarch is right, but what is the 'soul'? |
4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letter to G.H. Schaller [1674], 1674.10) | |
A reaction: Of course, this isn't 'freedom' at all, but it seems to exactly right as an account of so-called freedom. In the case of a human being the 'necessity of our own nature' is character, and virtue and vice are the expressions of the necessities of character. |
5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality. | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1112) | |
A reaction: A nice articulation of the intuition of all anti-physicalists. Plutarch would have to rethink his position carefully if he learned of the sheer number of connections in the brain, and of the theory of natural selection. His challenge remains, though. |
20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The sceptics say there are three movements of the soul: presentation, impulse and assent. …And action requires two things: a presentation of something to which one has an affinity, and an impulse toward what is presented as an object of affinity. | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], 1122c) | |
A reaction: Not much reasoning involved in this account, which the sceptics say is compatible with suspension of judgement. |
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169. |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262). |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other. |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991]) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition. |
5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: To live the good life is to live a life of participation in society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing. | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1108) | |
A reaction: 'Participation in society' is the interesting one. This might translate as 'doing your duty', or as 'leading a well-rounded life'. Solitude is wrong if you are indebted to others, and it is unhealthy if you are not. Is solitude really immoral, though? |
5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: If you accept atomism, you must show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. For example, how has the quality called 'hot' been imposed on the atoms? | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1111) | |
A reaction: This argument is still significant in current philosophy of mind. If temperature is 'mean kinetic energy', you are left wondering where the energy came from, and why minds experience the heat. This is the 'Hard Question'. |
5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: A city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveller has ever seen or will ever see. | |
From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1125) | |
A reaction: The nearest you might get would be Soviet Moscow, but in 1973 I saw a man there jeering at a woman who was kneeling in the street outside a closed church. Plutarch would be stunned at the decline in religious practices in modern Europe. |