Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Wittgenstein' and 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism'

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5 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

7091	The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
	Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8416	Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
	Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
	From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
	A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation

8418	Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
	Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
	From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
	A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.