5 ideas
| 6851 | We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk] |
| Full Idea: We encourage students to be concerned with whether an argument is valid or not, and we don't encourage them much to consider the question of whether the argument is interesting or not. | |
| From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.16) | |
| A reaction: What do you make of arguments which are very interesting, but (unfortunately) totally invalid? That said, this is a nice comment. A philosopher cannot contemplate too long or too deeply on the question of what is really 'interesting'. |
| 3914 | Language arranges sensory experience to form a world-order [Whorf] |
| Full Idea: Language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which results in a certain world-order. | |
| From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (Punctual and segmentive Hopi verbs [1936], p.55) | |
| A reaction: This is only true to a limited degree. See Davidson's 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme'. All humans share a world-order, to some extent. |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
| 6850 | Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk] |
| Full Idea: One of the most conspicuous things about Wittgenstein is that, on the ethics side, he pared his life down to the minimum, so as to make as central as possible his search for decency, the drive to be a decent person. | |
| From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.14) | |
| A reaction: It rather looks as if decency was quite an effort for him, as he had a rather waspish temperament, and people found it hard to get close to him. On the whole, though, he sounds like good company, as do nearly all the great philosophers. |