Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Punctual and segmentive Hopi verbs' and 'The Logical Syntax of Language'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

13342	Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
	Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
	From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
	A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

13251	Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
	Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
	A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism

3914	Language arranges sensory experience to form a world-order [Whorf]
	Full Idea: Language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which results in a certain world-order.
	From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (Punctual and segmentive Hopi verbs [1936], p.55)
	A reaction: This is only true to a limited degree. See Davidson's 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme'. All humans share a world-order, to some extent.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.