Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'works' and 'talk'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

6668	If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]
	Full Idea: Given the paradoxical nature of the 'present' moment, maybe we should understand ALL consciousness as memory, with the split second of the 'specious present' being very vivid and very brief memory, with the rest of the mind remembering in lower degrees.
	From: David Marshall (talk [2004]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a highly plausible, and very illuminating remark. For the time paradox, see Ideas 1904 and 5102. Anyone researching consciousness in the brain should think about this, because it will just be a special sort of memory neurons.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

4366	We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
	Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board.
	From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11
	A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality.