Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'A World of Propensities'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers

11946	Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
	Full Idea: Propensities should not be regarded as inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but should be regarded as inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was part).
	From: Karl Popper (A World of Propensities [1993], p.14), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 6.2
	A reaction: Molnar argues against this claim, and I agree with him. We can see why Popper might prefer this relational view, given that powers often only become apparent in unusual relational situations.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

14528	Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing.
	From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1)
	A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.