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15452
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We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
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From:
David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
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A reaction:
This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
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22449
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When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
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Full Idea:
One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
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A reaction:
True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
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6660
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Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
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From:
report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
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A reaction:
Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
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A reaction:
There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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Full Idea:
Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
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A reaction:
Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
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