Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'On the Soul (frags)' and 'talk'

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4 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
6901 Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
     Full Idea: Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding.
     From: Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5997 Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
     Full Idea: Dicaearchus advanced the view that mind and soul do not exist; there is only body configured in a certain way.
     From: report of Dicaearchus (On the Soul (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by William W. Fortenbaugh - Dicaearchus
     A reaction: Pure eliminativism! It is hard to find even ruthless modern physicalists taking such a bold view. Note that he is a pupil of Aristotle, and this does not sound like a major disagreement with his teacher's views.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.