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All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Naturalizing the Mind' and 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
     Full Idea: I think knowledge and truth are a matter of correspondence to facts, despite all the energy spent showing the naïveté of this view. The connections of our ideas in our heads correspond to relations in the outside world.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: Yes. Modern books offer the difficulties of defining 'correspondence', and finding an independent account of 'facts', as conclusive objections, but I say a brain is a truth machine, and it had better be useful. Indefinability doesn't nullify concepts.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
     Full Idea: The truth of "a=b" doesn't require much of 'a' and 'b' other than that there is a single thing to which they both refer. They needn't be interdefinable, or have supervenient properties. In this sense, identity is a very weak relation.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2)
     A reaction: Interesting. This is seeing the epistemological aspects of identity. Ontologically, identity must invoke Leibniz's Law, and is the ultimately powerful 'relation'. A given student, and the cause of a crop circle, may APPEAR to be quite different.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
     Full Idea: Using possible worlds to model truth-conditions of statements has led to considerable clarity about the logic of modality. Attempts to use the system for epistemic purposes, however, have been plagued by problems.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: Presumably what lurks behind this is a distinction between what is logically or naturally possible, and what appears to be possible from the perspective of a conscious mind. Is there a possible world in which I can fly?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
     Full Idea: Possible worlds can be thought of as indices for models of the language in question, or as concrete realities (David Lewis), or as abstract ways the world might be (Robert Stalnaker), or in various other ways.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: I strongly favour the Stalnaker route here. Reducing great metaphysics to mere language I find abhorrent, and I suspect that Lewis was trapped by his commitment to strong empiricism. We must embrace abstractions into our ontology.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3)
     A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
     Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3)
     A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Representations are in the head, but their content is not; in this sense, the mind isn't in the head any more than stories (i.e. story contents) are in books.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.6)
     A reaction: This is the final consequence of Putnam's idea that meanings ain't in the head. Intentionality is an extraordinary bridge between the brain and the external world. The ontology of stories, and musical compositions, is one philosophy's deepest problems.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
     Full Idea: We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §2.4)
     A reaction: A small and obvious, but important, point. Mental causation isn't just thoughts leading to physical happenings. Here Perry means that events can be designed to cause thoughts, such as a threatening letter. Not much room for epiphenomenalism here.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
     Full Idea: The brain state will involve certain parts of the brain, whereas my feeling of pain seems to be located in my hand insofar as it has a bodily location.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2)
     A reaction: This seems important to me. The brain is a ventriloquist. Perry implies that pain is quasi-disembodied, but it isn't, it is just experienced as IN the hand. Perhaps it is in the hand? Cutting the nerves loses contact with the pain.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Some tasks (playing the piano, speaking foreign languages, playing fast sports) are best performed when the agent is largely unconscious of the details.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Ch.4 n16)
     A reaction: A significant point, but it supports the evolutionary view, which is that what matters is success, and consciousness will switch on or off, whichever promotes the activity best.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
     Full Idea: It seems quite plausible to me that many animals have experiences without knowing about them.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.1)
     A reaction: I agree, which makes us acknowledge levels of consciousness, which probably applies to human experience as well. The simplest idea is to distinguish between experiences which involve concepts, and those which don't. Animals sometimes appear surprised.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The Representational Thesis of mind identifies the qualities of experience - qualia - with the properties objects are represented as having.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §3.2)
     A reaction: This seems to challenge the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, of which I am very fond. Is 'looks beautiful' a property of an object? Is the feeling of anger a property of an object? Qualia are properties of brains?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
     Full Idea: On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
     A reaction: This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions.
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4)
     A reaction: There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right.
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The 'problem' of introspection evaporates once one understands that it is not a process in which one looks inward.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
     A reaction: I take it that when we introspect we look at the contents of thoughts, which are representations of the external world, on the whole. But surely only the connections of those contents with memories can be seen inwardly?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2)
     A reaction: Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
     Full Idea: A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
     A reaction: Presumably brain events bring the world into the mind, so the world must be mentioned in explaining the mind. Maybe 'externalism' sounds grand, but is stating the boringly obvious. Explanations of mind need no mention of external particulars.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
     Full Idea: Advocates of the mind-body identity theory typically claimed that identity between particular mental states and brain states was contingent, until Kripke argued persuasively that identity is always necessary.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: Kripke wanted to argue against the identity theory, but what he seems to have done is reformulate it into a much more powerful version (involving necessary identity).
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol)
     A reaction: The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
     Full Idea: The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3)
     A reaction: We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
     Full Idea: Although we classify ideas by content for many purposes, we do not individuate them by content. The content of an idea can change.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2)
     A reaction: As the compiler of this database, I find this very appealing. The mind works exactly like a database. I have a 'file' (Perry's word) marked "London", the content of which undergoes continual change. I am a database management system.
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
     Full Idea: In possible-worlds semantics, expressions have intensions, which are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions (names to individuals, n-place predicates to n-tuples, and sentences to truth values, built from parts).
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: Interesting. Perry distinguishes 'referential' (or 'subject matter') content, which is prior to the link to extensions - a link which creates 'reflexive' content. He is keen that they should not become confused. True knowledge is 'situated'.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
     Full Idea: The proposition expressed by a sentence can be thought of as a set of possible worlds, the worlds for which its intension delivers truth.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
     A reaction: It has always struck me as important to hang on to the concept of a 'proposition' (over and above sentences). This idea gives a metaphysics for the concept, and the 'language of thought' offers appropriate brain structures. A neat picture.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
     Full Idea: Although there is seldom a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction to be drawn in the case of our concepts, there are clearly things that are more and less central.
     From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2)
     A reaction: Most Americans seem enslaved to Quine on this one, so it is nice to see the obvious being stated for once. Human thought is an organic offshoot of the natural world. To think it is all arbitrary and changeable is human arrogance.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.