5 ideas
22518 | The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Actual events are evidently possible, otherwise they would not have occurred. | |
From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b18) | |
A reaction: [quoted online by Peter Adamson] Seems like common sense, but it's important to have Aristotle assert it. |
19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whatever concerns reasonable substances (the minds of men) is more naturally explained by the consideration of ends, whereas other substances (bodies) are better explained by efficient causes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Geometrical Method and Metaphysics [1712], p.89) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that the type of causal explanation considered most appropriate is the one that leads to the greatest understanding. So there is no absolute or correct answer as to which type of causation is the more important. |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
16566 | Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. | |
From: Aristotle (The Poetics [c.347 BCE], 1451b05) | |
A reaction: Hm. Characters in great novels achieve universality by being representated very particularly. Great depth of mind seems required to be a poet, but less so for a historian (though there is, I presume, no upward limit on the possible level of thought). |