Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour

6848	Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour, for me, is practically enacted philosophy.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: This may be overstating it, as the funniest jokes may be the least philosophical, and remarks may be faintly amusing but very profound. Lear and his Fool make up a single worldview together.

6847	Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Humour provides an oblique phenomenology of ordinary life; it is a way of describing the situation of our existence, and, at its best, it indicates how we might change that situation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: The trouble is that this leads us to relentlessly political standup comedians who aren't very funny. Critichley may have a problem with remarks which are very funny precisely because they are so politically incorrect. I sympathise, though.

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

6844	Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
	A reaction: He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

6835	German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
	A reaction: He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.

6837	Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.

6836	Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If reason must criticise itself (in Kant) how does one avoid total scepticism? In my view, the problem that has animated the continental tradition since Jacobi (early 19th cent) is the threat of nihilism.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
	A reaction: As an outsider to 'continental' philosophy, this is the most illuminating remark I have read about it. It is not only a plausible account of the movement, but also a very worth aim, which should be taken seriously by analytical philosophers.

6838	Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
	Full Idea: The basic map of the continental tradition can be summarised in three terms: critique, praxis and emancipation.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.189)
	A reaction: I wince at 'emancipation', which seems to take freedom as of unquestionably high value, instead of being one of the principles up for question in social philosophy. There are more presuppositions in Marxist than in analytical philosophy.

6845	Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
	Full Idea: In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
	A reaction: From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology

6846	Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
	Full Idea: Phenomenology (as in the later Husserl) is for me a way of assembling reminders which clarify the social world in which we exist; it is a technique of redescription.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
	A reaction: I'm not sure if I can identify with this as a target for philosophy, but it is interesting and sound worthy of effort. Critchley offers this as the best strand in 'continental' philosophy, rather than the big explanatory ideas.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

12699	A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

12700	Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12736	If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
	Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

12698	Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism

6843	Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
	Full Idea: If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
	From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
	A reaction: This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.