Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Some Models for Implicature' and 'Things'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted ‘things’.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Things [1995])
     A reaction: There might be lots of borderline cases here. Is the sky a thing? Is air a thing? How is transparency a thing? Is minus-one a thing? Is an incomplete proposition a thing? Etc.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
     Full Idea: The slogan that meaning is use came under scrutiny by Grice's theory of conversational implicature. He said patterns of use shown in analysis were often semantically irrelevant, snce they are due not meanings of expressions but to pragmatic principles.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.8
     A reaction: I think the simplest objection is that words only have use because they have a meaning; The most interesting part of pragmatics is what you DON'T say in conversation.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quality says one ought not to assert what one believes to be false.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: The obvious exception is irony, where are truth is asserted, but the listener is supposed to spot that you are not really asserting it.
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: An alternative maxim of conversation is that there should not be long silences between contributions - which would probably result if the contributions are all curtly abbreviated.
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quantity says 'make your contributions as informative as required'.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: Is the 'requirement' of informative for the speaker or for the listener? It is easy to image situations where, one way or the other, the two people don't agree about informativenss.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.