7 ideas
| 22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
| 22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
| 19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I do not think it necessary to recommend to people universal doubt ...in fact, we are constantly seeking reasons for thoughts about which there is no doubt at all. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts [1680], p.34) | |
| A reaction: Such confidence is, of course, asking for trouble. I prefer Peirce's fallibilism - that robust realism is the most coherent view, and the only one worth pursuing and relying on, but you never know.... |
| 22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
| Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
| 22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
| Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |