5 ideas
21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
Full Idea: Bergson was a rallying point for all the opposition, …not so much because of the theme of duration, as of the theory and practice of becoming of all kinds, of coexistent multiplicities. | |
From: report of Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory [1896]) by Gilles Deleuze - A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? I | |
A reaction: The three heroes of Deleuze are Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson. All philosophers are either of Being, or of Becoming, I suggest. |
21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
Full Idea: Bergson has shown that memory is not an actual image which forms after the object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual perception of the object. | |
From: report of Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory [1896]) by Gilles Deleuze - The Actual and the Virtual p.114 | |
A reaction: It strikes me as plausible to say that all conscious life is memory. Perceiving the present instant is only possible because it endures for a tiny moment. |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
7492 | Early societies are based on community, and modern societies on association [Tönnies, by Watson] |
Full Idea: Pre-modern societies are based on community (Gemeinschaft), whereas modern societies are based on association (Gesellschaft). | |
From: report of Ferdinand Tönnies (Community and Association [1887]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.32 | |
A reaction: A very interesting distinction. The modern term implies contracts, and it strikes me as an extremely accurate description of modern liberal democracies. There is very little sense of community, but a strong sense of innumerable contracts that bind us. |