7 ideas
16137 | Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: For centuries 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' (+ Porphyry's 'Isagoge') formed the core of the philosophical corpus still being seriously studied. It is hardly surprising that our received view of Aristotle was coloured substantially by 'Categories'. | |
From: Michael Frede (Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' [1983], I) | |
A reaction: He adds that doubts remain about the authenticity of the second part, and the whole thing bears marks of having been edited. |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Putnam claims that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems indicate that there is no 'fact of the matter' whether all sets are constructible. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism | |
A reaction: [He refers to the 4th and 5th pages of Putnam's article] Shapiro offers (p.109) a critique of Putnam's proposal. |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: V = L just says all sets are constructible. L is the class of all constructible sets, and V is the universe of all sets. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.425) |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem says that a satisfiable first-order theory (in a countable language) has a countable model. ..I argue that this is not a logical antinomy, but close to one in philosophy of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.421) | |
A reaction: See the rest of this paper for where he takes us on this. |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Experience with nature is undoubtedly the source of our most basic 'mathematical intuitions', even if it is unfashionable to say so. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.424) | |
A reaction: Correct. I find it quite bewildering how Frege has managed to so discredit all empirical and psychological approaches to mathematics that it has become a heresy to say such things. |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |