6 ideas
| 14380 | The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers distinguish between necessary properties and essential properties. This distinction is irrelevant to my purposes. Following Yablo, I shall ignore this distinction in what follows. | |
| From: Michael della Rocca (Essentialists and Essentialism [1996], I n1) | |
| A reaction: This is two years after Kit Fine's seminal paper suggesting the distinction is real. The first step towards a good metaphysics is to realise that Della Rocca and Yablo have made a horrible mistake. |
| 1394 | Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers] |
| Full Idea: If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own. | |
| From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A)) | |
| A reaction: Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing. |
| 1395 | Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers] |
| Full Idea: What makes it true that a particular thought or experience is a member of one bundle rather than another? | |
| From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (B)) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if you can answer this nice question without mentioning values. The mental events in are in my bundle because they matter to me (because they are related to my body, for which I am responsible). Compare picking my possessions out of a pile. |
| 1396 | We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers] |
| Full Idea: We can have no conception of the particularity of conscious states prior to, and independently of, a conception of a particularity of persons. | |
| From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (C)) | |
| A reaction: agrees with Butler |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |