8 ideas
| 22002 | Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: The dominant philosophy of mid-eighteenth century Germany was Wolffianism, a codified and almost legalistically organised form of Leibnizian thought. | |
| From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Kant grew up in this intellectual climate. |
| 22021 | Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: Early Romanticism can be seen as the exploration of subjective interiority and as the re-enchantment of nature (as organic). Hegel said they had the idea of a 'beautiful soul', which (he said) either paralysed action, or made them smug. | |
| From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 06) | |
| A reaction: [compressed, inc Note 1] A major dilemma of life is the extent of our social engagement, because it makes life worthwhile, but pollutes the mind with continual conflicts. |
| 22010 | The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: After the French Revolution, philosophy suddenly became the key rallying point for an entire generation of German intellectuals, who had been reading Kant as the harbinger of a new order. | |
| From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Pt II Intro) | |
| A reaction: Kant was a harbinger because he offered an autonomous status to each individual, rather than being subservient to a social order. |
| 22036 | In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: In Hegel's time the shorthand for the Naturalistic worldview was 'Spinozism'. | |
| From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 10) | |
| A reaction: Spinozism hit Germany like a bomb in 1786, when it was reported that the poet Hölderlin was a fan of Spinoza. |
| 14380 | The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers distinguish between necessary properties and essential properties. This distinction is irrelevant to my purposes. Following Yablo, I shall ignore this distinction in what follows. | |
| From: Michael della Rocca (Essentialists and Essentialism [1996], I n1) | |
| A reaction: This is two years after Kit Fine's seminal paper suggesting the distinction is real. The first step towards a good metaphysics is to realise that Della Rocca and Yablo have made a horrible mistake. |
| 22048 | Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: Idealism was conceived as a link between reason and freedom. | |
| From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 14 Conc) | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to see the Romantic era as the Age of Freedom, which followed the Age of Reason. This idea fits that picture nicely. Pinkard says that paradoxes resulted from the attemptl |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |