Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'I.39 On Solitude' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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6 ideas

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

6866	It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure

22269	We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne]
	Full Idea: I am training and sharpening my appetite for those pleasures that are left. ...We must cling tooth and claw to the use of the pleasures of this life which the advancing years, one after another, rip from our grasp.
	From: Michel de Montaigne (I.39 On Solitude [1580], p.276)
	A reaction: That may be one of the most inspiring ideas I have read about pleasure.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism

6867	Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
	A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

6865	A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?