6 ideas
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
| 7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
| Full Idea: All art is quite useless. | |
| From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
| A reaction: Echoes Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. Although I find Wilde's claims that morality has nothing to do with art to be naïve, I find this remark sympathetic. Art may play with moral feelings, but is unlikely to affect actions. |
| 20436 | Art leads to mental health, and mental clarity [Beardsley,M, by Carroll,N] |
| Full Idea: Beardsley says aesthetic experience relieves tensions and quiet destructive emotions. It also aids us in sorting out the jumble in the flow of consciousness, by virtue of its tendencies toward heightened clarity and coherence. | |
| From: report of Monroe Beardsley (Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism [1958]) by Noël Carroll - Monroe Beardsley p.162-3 | |
| A reaction: I find this claim highly implausible. I like art, but I feel neither healthier nor clearer after experiencing it. |
| 7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
| Full Idea: There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all. | |
| From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
| A reaction: This is simply false. Novels that are viciously (or subtly) racist, sexist, homophobic, or egotistical can obviously be immoral. I could write a nasty story about Oscar Wilde. It might, though, be very well written. If life is moral, so are novels. |
| 7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |
| Full Idea: No artist has ethical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style. | |
| From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
| A reaction: This has a Nietzschean suggestion that the artist is 'beyond good and evil', and operates on some higher level of values, which in Wilde's case seem to be purely aesthetic. You can't justify a callous murder by executing it beautifully. |