Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'The Architecture of Mathematics' and 'Croce and Collingwood'

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics is a storehouse of abstract structures [Bourbaki]
     Full Idea: From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears as a storehouse of abstract forms - the mathematical structures.
     From: Nicholas Bourbaki (The Architecture of Mathematics [1950], 221-32), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.79
     A reaction: This seems to be the culmination of the structuralist view that developed from Dedekind and Hilbert, and was further developed by philosophers in the 1990s.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
     Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
     Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood).
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that.
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
     Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing.
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
     Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art!