5515
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Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
I believe it is worth considering imaginary cases (such as Teletransportation), as we can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
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A reaction:
The trouble is that we might say that IF I were suddenly turned into a pig, then I would come to believe in dualism, but that will not and cannot happen, because dualism is false. It seems essential to accept the natural possibility of the case.
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5516
|
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
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Full Idea:
We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.').
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From:
report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction.
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16744
|
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
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A reaction:
This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?
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5016
|
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
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A reaction:
Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.
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16633
|
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
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A reaction:
Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.
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5005
|
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07)
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A reaction:
The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive.
|
5006
|
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09)
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A reaction:
There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements.
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5012
|
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom.
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From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49)
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|
A reaction:
There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable.
|
5004
|
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
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A reaction:
A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.
|
5514
|
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be (as in an 'identity crisis'). But when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean.
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|
From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
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A reaction:
I think it is important to note that the philosophical problem breaks down into two areas: whether I have numerical identity with myself over time, and whether other people have it. It may be that two different sets of criteria will emerge.
|
5521
|
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters.
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|
From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314)
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|
A reaction:
I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings.
|
5519
|
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
If I am largely paralysed, and my twin brother is dying of brain disease, then if the operation to graft my head onto his body is offered, I should accept the operation, and it is irrelevant whether this person would be me.
|
|
From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.308)
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|
A reaction:
Parfit notes that the brain is a particularly significant part of the process. The fact that I might cheerfully accept this offer without philosophical worries doesn't get rid of the question 'who is this person?' Who should they remain married to?
|
5520
|
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
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|
Full Idea:
If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists.
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|
From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310)
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|
A reaction:
It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so.
|
5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48)
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|
A reaction:
This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality.
|
5018
|
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
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|
A reaction:
If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.
|
6660
|
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
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|
Full Idea:
Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
|
|
From:
report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
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|
A reaction:
Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
|
5008
|
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame.
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|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
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|
A reaction:
This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere?
|
15987
|
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
|
|
A reaction:
This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity.
|
16601
|
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
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|
Full Idea:
The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth.
|
|
From:
René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5
|