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13913
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The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
There are four 'perfect syllogisms': Barbara (every M is P, every S is M, so every S is P); Celarent (no M is P, every S is M, so no S is P); Darii (every M is P, some S is M, so some S is P); Ferio (no M is P, some S is M, so some S is not P).
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
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A reaction:
The four names are mnemonics from medieval universities.
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13916
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Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
Term logic begins with expressions and two 'term functors'. Any simple letter is a 'term', any term prefixed by a minus ('-') is a 'negative term', and any pair of terms flanking a plus ('+') is a 'compound term'. Parenthese are used for grouping.
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
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A reaction:
[see Engelbretsen and Sayward for the full formal system]
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13849
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Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
Classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity (and usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models), whereas constructivist logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation.
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From:
Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Intro)
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A reaction:
My instincts go with the classical view, which is that inferences do not depend on the human capacity to defend them, but sit there awaiting revelation. My view isn't platonist, because I take the inferences to be rooted in the physical world.
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6660
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Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
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From:
report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
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A reaction:
Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
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19891
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Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
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Full Idea:
Men saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This contrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.
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From:
Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], I s.10), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government 111 n1
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A reaction:
One British school has a single rule, that pupils 'shall always treat other people with respect'. Presumably the rulers, as well as the pupils, must decide when this is transgressed. The rule of law may be preferable.
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17005
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Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]
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Full Idea:
Things natural …do so necessarily observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep those forms which give them their being they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do.
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From:
Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], 1.3.4), quoted by Marc Lange - Laws and Lawmakers 1.2
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A reaction:
Cited by some as the beginnings of the idea of 'laws of nature', but it is striking that Hooker says the laws are controlled by 'forms' (which are Aristotelian essences). This is an essentialist view of laws, not a regularity or divine power one.
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