13 ideas
18189 | ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane] |
Full Idea: We have at hand no proof that the axioms of ZFC for set theory will never yield a contradiction, while Gödel's second theorem tells us that such a consistency proof cannot be conducted within ZFC. | |
From: Saunders MacLane (Mathematics: Form and Function [1986], p.406), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics | |
A reaction: Maddy quotes this, while defending set theory as the foundation of mathematics, but it clearly isn't the most secure foundation that could be devised. She says the benefits of set theory do not need guaranteed consistency (p.30). |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a problem of free will only for those who think that the notion of voluntary can be metaphysically deepened. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) | |
A reaction: Years later, I now see that his refers to a pet hate of mine in discussions of free will, which is the idea that a person can have something called 'ultimate' responsibility for an action (which is the 'deep' version of 'you did it'). |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a deluded Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom will totally coincide. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], VI - p.158) |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Williams has shown that whether an action was weakness of will depends on an evaluation after the event, as in the question of whether Gauguin was right to abandon his family to pursue his art. | |
From: report of Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993]) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
A reaction: The 'Gauguin Problem' is that Gauguin's actions only become weakness of will if the pictures are no good, and he can't know that till he's painted them. Good point. |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53) |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: In what I have done, the guilt points in one direction towards what has happened to others, and the shame in another direction to what I am. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.92) | |
A reaction: Not convinced. I think shame has the fear of being observed as an inescapable component. Even when alone shame involves imagining what others might think. |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7) |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Duty in some abstract modern sense is largely unknown to the Greeks, in particular to archaic Greeks. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], II - p.41) |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95) |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If we think the power of reason is not enough by itself to distinguish good and bad, then we would hope that people have limited autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries some social weight. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.100) |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a "problem of evil" only for those who expect the world to be good. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) |