Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Lecture on Applicability of Mathematics' and 'Papers of 1913'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
It is spooky the way mathematics anticipates physics [Weinberg]
     Full Idea: It is positively spooky how the physicist finds the mathematician has been there before him or her.
     From: Steven Weinberg (Lecture on Applicability of Mathematics [1986], p.725), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 2.3
     A reaction: This suggests that mathematics might be the study of possibilities or hypotheticals, like mental rehearsals for physics. See Hellman's modal structuralism. Maybe mathematicians are reading the mind of God, but I doubt that.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
     Full Idea: Possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual, and that the mere possibility is nothing.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1913 [1913], VII.26), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Logic'
     A reaction: Quine agreed with Russell on this. You won't get far in life if you deny possibilities. The answer is to recognise that the actual is dynamic, and not passive.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.