Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Contextualism Defended' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms

14212	A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
	Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
	A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

14213	Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
	A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

14210	A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
	A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

12893	Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
	Full Idea: Contextualism explains the appeal of sceptical arguments by allowing that the claims of the sceptic are true, relative to the very strict context in which they are made.
	From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.57)
	A reaction: This strikes me a right. I've always thought that global scepticism must be conceded if we are being very strict indeed about justification, but also that it is ridiculous to be that strict. So the epistemological question is 'How strict should we be?'

12896	Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
	Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification.
	From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68)
	A reaction: I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism

12894	There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
	Full Idea: The problem for invariantism is that competent speakers, under sceptical pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories etc.
	From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.58)
	A reaction: This is aimed at Idea 12892. This seems to me a strong response to the rather weak invariantist case (that there is 'really and truly' only one invariant standard for knowledge). Full strength scepticism about everything demolishes all knowledge.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14215	Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
	A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

14209	Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
	A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.