Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'De Cive' and 'On Sufficient Reason'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought

19404	Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The principle of contradiction is the principle of necessity, and the principle that a sufficient reason must be given is the principle of contingency.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: [this paragraph is actually undated] Contradictions occur in concrete actuality, as well as in theories and formal systems. If so, then there are necessities in nature. Are they discoverable a posteriori? Leibniz says not.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants

23609	I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: If I wage war at the commandment of my Prince, conceiving the war to be justly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly, but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my Prince.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (De Cive [1642], 12.II), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 2.6
	A reaction: Hobbes early says that Princes make things just by commanding them. This presumably assumes divine authority in the Prince. This is, of course, ancient pernicious nonsense.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

19403	Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world?