Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception' and 'Intro to I: Classical Logic'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

9463	Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
	Full Idea: Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
	From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
	A reaction: All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

23647	Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
	Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

11958	Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
	Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
	A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

23646	Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
	Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

23645	A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

7861	Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
	A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).

6660	Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
	From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
	A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.