Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'A Short History of German Philosophy' and 'The Concept of Logical Consequence'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Early Romantics sought a plurality of systems, in a quest for freedom [Hösle]
     Full Idea: It was an early Romantic idea that there is necessarily a plurality of systems in which individuality is expressed; for a complete system would destroy freedom.
     From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 7)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why you are free because you are locked into system that differs from that of other people. True freedom seems to be either no system, or continually remaking one's own system. Why is such freedom valuable? Freedom v truth?
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read]
     Full Idea: The Representational account of validity says an argument is valid if there is no situation where the premises are true and the conclusion false. The Interpretation account says the premises are true and conclusion false under no interpretations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: My immediate instinct is to want logic to be about situations, rather than interpretations. Situations are more about thought, where interpretations are more about language. I think our account of logic should have some applicability to animals.
Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read]
     Full Idea: In Etchemendy's Interpretational Semantics (perhaps better called 'Substitutional') we keep the situation fixed and vary the interpretation; in Representational Semantics ('Modal'?) we keep interpretations fixed but consider varying situations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: [compressed] These are semantic strategies for interpreting logic, so they are two ways you might go about assessing an argument.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
In the 18th century history came to be seen as progressive, rather than cyclical [Hösle]
     Full Idea: The turning point in the history of the philosophy of history occurs in the eighteenth century, when the ancient cyclical model of Vico is superseded by the idea of progress.
     From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 6)
     A reaction: He says that Hegel merely inherited this progressive view, rather than creating it. I'm not sure how widely held the cyclical view was. I don't recognise it in Shakespeare. Science and technology must have suggested progress.