18 ideas
| 23531 | Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher's task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all to enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. …The politician's eye does not see the possible, being attracted instead by the probable. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
| A reaction: An inspiring idea! He is rejecting Marx's aim of changing the world, which had 'catastrophic' results. But I love his view of interpretation as spotting tendencies and possibilities. This fits my preferred ontology of dispositions and powers. |
| 10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: A logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages, and its older meaning is the study of the rules of sound argument. The languages can be used as a framework for studying rules of argument. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: [Hodges then says he will stick to the languages] The suspicion is that one might confine the subject to the artificial languages simply because it is easier, and avoids the tricky philosophical questions. That approximates to computer programming. |
| 10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: To have a truth-value, a first-order formula needs an 'interpretation' (I) of its constants, and a 'valuation' (ν) of its variables. Something in the world is attached to the constants; objects are attached to variables. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) |
| 10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: Semantic rules can be presented in 'Tarski style', where the interpretation-plus-valuation is reduced to the same question for simpler formulas, or the 'Henkin-Hintikka style' in terms of games, or the 'Barwise-Etchemendy style' for computers. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: I haven't yet got the hang of the latter two, but I note them to map the territory. |
| 10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: [There should be no space between the vertical and the two horizontals!] This contrasts with |-, which means 'is proved in'. That is a syntactic or proof-theoretic symbol, whereas |= is a semantic symbol (involving truth). |
| 10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (the weakest form): If L is a first-order language with at most countably many formulas, and T is a consistent theory in L. Then T has a model with at most countably many elements. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
| 10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: every first-order theory with infinite models has arbitrarily large models. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
| 10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: Compactness Theorem: suppose T is a first-order theory, ψ is a first-order sentence, and T entails ψ. Then there is a finite subset U of T such that U entails ψ. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: If entailment is possible, it can be done finitely. |
| 10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
| Full Idea: A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class. | |
| From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.6) |
| 23538 | Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Consciousness is the only place where nothingness exists. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], II 'Expanding') | |
| A reaction: Not sure about this, but an interesting remark from someone with a Hegelian background. We certainly have a concept of nothingness (a mental file of it, even). |
| 23532 | The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: A sense of guilt is linked to the delusion of free will. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to) | |
| A reaction: I agree that free will is a delusion, but I'm not sure about this. Clearly if you think you are 'ultimately' responsible for all of your actions this will increase guilt, but belief in free will is compatible with various excuses for actions. |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
| 23537 | American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: American white men trusted the promises of neoliberal selfishness, they trusted the philosophy of winning, then discovered losing. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
| A reaction: The most pernicious terminology in the English-speaking world is the labelling of people as 'winners' and 'losers'. We celebrate the one winner, and ignore everyone else. Celebrity, excessive wealth, honourable titles. |
| 23536 | Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Community is only a nostalgic memory of a past condition of belonging that exists no longer. Regret, not a living experience. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism') | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this. Local heroes in my town make lovely efforts to improve the place (with flowers, sculptures) but most of us don't know who they are. Capitalist competition erodes community. |
| 23534 | Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Communist internationalism was the only attempt to reconcile the workers of the West and the oppressed population of the Global South, and this attempt failed. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
| A reaction: It was unfortunate that communism was launched in Russia, which we now see (in 2023) as poisoned by imperialist ambitions, and quite unsuited to international idealism. The Chinese are notably active in Africa. |
| 23533 | The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: The economy has progressively acquired the central place in the system of knowledge and research. Re-enacting the privilege of theocracy in the Middle Ages. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. This is indeed how the economy is treated, centring on Gross National Product (no matter how distributed), and economic league tables. Is it even a quasi-religion? |
| 23535 | Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi] |
| Full Idea: Western workers are following nationalist agendas in order to avert the effects of globalization, and resorting to nationalist and racist forms of identification. | |
| From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred') | |
| A reaction: By 'globalisation' must be meant the impersonal work and exploitation that results from huge ruthless anonymous companies. People barely know who they are working for, so it can't give them an identity. |