14 ideas
10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages, and its older meaning is the study of the rules of sound argument. The languages can be used as a framework for studying rules of argument. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Hodges then says he will stick to the languages] The suspicion is that one might confine the subject to the artificial languages simply because it is easier, and avoids the tricky philosophical questions. That approximates to computer programming. |
10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: To have a truth-value, a first-order formula needs an 'interpretation' (I) of its constants, and a 'valuation' (ν) of its variables. Something in the world is attached to the constants; objects are attached to variables. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) |
10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Semantic rules can be presented in 'Tarski style', where the interpretation-plus-valuation is reduced to the same question for simpler formulas, or the 'Henkin-Hintikka style' in terms of games, or the 'Barwise-Etchemendy style' for computers. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) | |
A reaction: I haven't yet got the hang of the latter two, but I note them to map the territory. |
10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [There should be no space between the vertical and the two horizontals!] This contrasts with |-, which means 'is proved in'. That is a syntactic or proof-theoretic symbol, whereas |= is a semantic symbol (involving truth). |
10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (the weakest form): If L is a first-order language with at most countably many formulas, and T is a consistent theory in L. Then T has a model with at most countably many elements. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: every first-order theory with infinite models has arbitrarily large models. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Compactness Theorem: suppose T is a first-order theory, ψ is a first-order sentence, and T entails ψ. Then there is a finite subset U of T such that U entails ψ. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) | |
A reaction: If entailment is possible, it can be done finitely. |
10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.6) |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 | |
A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher. |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3 | |
A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals? |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science. |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11. |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |