Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Sentences' and 'Later Letters to Dedekind'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Cantor gives informal versions of ZF axioms as ways of getting from one set to another [Cantor, by Lake]
     Full Idea: Cantor gives informal versions of the axioms of ZF as ways of getting from one set to another.
     From: report of George Cantor (Later Letters to Dedekind [1899]) by John Lake - Approaches to Set Theory 1.6
     A reaction: Lake suggests that it should therefore be called CZF.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion.
     From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2
     A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation.