36 ideas
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
Full Idea: Bolzano said the 'laws of thought' (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are true, but nothing of interest follows from them. Logic obeys them, but they are not logic's first principles or axioms. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], §3) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic | |
A reaction: An interesting and crucial distinction. For samples of proposed axioms of logic, see Ideas 6408, 7798 and 7797. |
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
Full Idea: It is not out of the question to hold that without circular justifications there is no reasonableness at all. That is the view of a certain kind of coherence theorist. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 2) | |
A reaction: This nicely captures a gut feeling I have had for a long time. Being now thoroughly converted to coherentism, I am drawn to the idea - like a moth to a flame. But how do we distinguish cuddly circularity from its cruel and vicious cousin? |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
Full Idea: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as 'health' is a name for other processes in life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: So the slogan is 'truth is success in belief'? Suicide and racist genocide can be 'successful'. I would have thought that truth was the end of a process, rather than the process itself. |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
Full Idea: When you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of a clock, it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy. ...Where our ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: This is a very good criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. It looks a lovely theory when you can map components of a sentence (like 'the pen is in the drawer') onto components of reality - but it has to cover the hard cases. |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatists say that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the close similarity (at least in James) of the pragmatic view of truth and the coherence theory of truth (associated later with Blanshard). Perhaps the coherence theory is one version of the pragmatic account |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
Full Idea: A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: Note the tell-tale locution 'counts as' true, rather than 'is' true. The obvious problem is that someone with a big stock of foolish beliefs will 'count as' true some bad interpretation which is gratifyingly assimilated to their current confusions. |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
Full Idea: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: The immediate question is why you should label something as 'false' simply on the grounds that you can't corroborate it. Proving the falsity is a stronger position than the ignorance James seems happy with. 'Assimilate' implies coherence. |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Bolzano if the father of 'arithmetization', which sought to found all of analysis on the concepts of arithmetic and to eliminate geometrical notions entirely (with logicism taking it a step further, by reducing arithmetic to logic). | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 3 | |
A reaction: Brown's book is a defence of geometrical diagrams against Bolzano's approach. Bolzano sounds like the modern heir of Pythagoras, if he thinks that space is essentially numerical. |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Bolzano began the process of eliminating intuition from analysis, by proving something apparently obvious (that as continuous function must be zero at some point). Proof reveals on what a theorem rests, and that it is not intuition. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Kant was the target of Bolzano's attack. Two responses might be to say that many other basic ideas are intuited but impossible to prove, or to say that proof itself depends on intuition, if you dig deep enough. |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: Mathematical proofs are philosophical in method if they do not only demonstrate that a certain mathematical truth holds but if they also disclose why it holds, that is, if they uncover its grounds. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3 | |
A reaction: I aim to defend the role of explanation in mathematics, but this says that this is only if the proofs are 'philosophical', which may be of no interest to mathematicians. Oh well, that's their loss. |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
Full Idea: What shall we call a 'thing' anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 7) | |
A reaction: James wrote just before the discovery of galaxies, which are much more obviously 'things' than constellations like the Plough are! This idea suggests a connection between pragmatism and the nihilist view of objects of Van Inwagen and co. |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
Full Idea: 'Substance' appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: This is the strongly empirical strain in James's empiricism. This sounds like a David Lewis comment on the Humean mosaic of experience. We Aristotelians at least believe that the groups run much deeper than the surface of experience. |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
Full Idea: Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that false optimism can often often be what is 'good in the way of belief'. That said, I think quite a good way to specify 'truth' is 'success in belief', but I mean intrinsically successful, not pragmatically successful. |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Propositions such as 'People usually tell the truth' seem to count as default reasonable, but it is odd to count them as a priori. Empirical indefeasibility seems the obvious way to distinguish those default reasonable propositions that are a priori. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but it would mean that all the uniformities of nature would then count as a priori. 'Every physical object exerts gravity' probably has no counterexamples, but doesn't seem a priori (even if it is necessary). See Idea 9164. |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
Full Idea: I argue not that our most basic rules are a priori or empirically indefeasible, but that we treat them as empirically defeasible and indeed a priori; we don't regard anything as evidence against them. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the fictionalist view of a priori knowledge (and of most other things, such as mathematics). I can't agree. Most people treat heaps of a posteriori truths (like the sun rising) as a priori. 'Mass involves energy' is indefeasible a posteriori. |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Most governments seem to find lies more useful than the truth. Maybe most children are better off not knowing the truth about their parents. It might be disastrous to know the truth about what other people are thinking. Is 'useful but false' meaningful? |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Bolzano was determined to expel Kantian intuition from analysis, and to prove from first principles anything that could be proved, no matter how obvious it might seem when thought of in geometrical terms. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 2.3 | |
A reaction: This is characteristic of the Enlightenment Project, well after the Enlightenment. It is a step towards Frege's attack on 'psychologism' in mathematics. The problem is that it led us into a spurious platonism. We live in troubled times. |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Reliability is not a 'factual property'; in calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value. We place a high value on the reliability of our inductive and perceptual rules that lead to truth. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to be a contradiction of reliabilism, since truth is a pretty widespread epistemological value. If you do value truth, then eyes are pretty reliable organs for attaining it. Reliabilism is still wrong, but not for this reason. |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Reliability is not all we want in an inductive rule. Completely reliable methods are available, such as believing nothing, or only believing logical truths. But we don't value them, but value less reliable methods with other characteristics. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: I would take this excellent point to be an advertisement for inference to the best explanation, which requires not only reliable inputs of information, but also a presiding rational judge to assess the mass of evidence. |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
Full Idea: We should concede that different people have slightly different basic epistemological standards. ..I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of 'correctness' here. | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5) | |
A reaction: I think this is dead right. There is a real relativism about knowledge, which exists at the level of justification, rather than of truth. The scientific revolution just consisted of making the standards tougher, and that seems to have been a good idea. |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
Full Idea: Theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one to work. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: This follows his criticism of the quest for 'solving names' - big words that give bogus solutions to problems. James's view is not the same as 'instrumentalism', though he would probably sympathise with that view. The defines theories badly. |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
Full Idea: The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: It looks to me like we should distinguish 'active' and 'passive' instrumentalism. The passive version says there is no more to theories and truth than what instruments record. James's active version says truth is an instrument for doing things well. |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist view is that all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted world enigma. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 5) | |
A reaction: This treats instrumentalism as the pragmatic idea of theories as what works (and nothing more), with, presumably, no interest in grasping something called 'reality'. Presumably instrumentalism might have other motivations - such as fun. |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status). | |
From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view). |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
Full Idea: Concepts for the pragmatist are things to come back into experience with, things to make us look for differences. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: That's good. I like both halves of this. Experience gives us the concepts, but then we 'come back' into experience equipped with them. Presumably animals can look for differences, but concepts enhance that hugely. Know the names of the flowers. |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Bolzano took the entities of which truth is predicated to be not propositions in the subjective sense but 'propositions-in-themselves' - objective entities existing independent of our apprehension. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Emp' | |
A reaction: A serious mistake. Presumably the objective propositions are all true (or there would be endless infinities of them). So what is assessed in the case of error? Something other than the objective propositions! We assess these other things! |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: Bolzano conceived of propositions as abstract objects which are structured compounds of concepts and potential contents of judgements and assertions. | |
From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3 | |
A reaction: Personally I think of propositions as brain events, the constituents of thought about the world, but that needn't contradict the view of them as 'abstract'. |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
Full Idea: What I mean by 'propositions' is not what the grammarians call a proposition, namely the linguistic expression, but the mere sense of this expression, is what is meant by proposition in itself or object proposition. This sense can be true or false. | |
From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref?) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of what we understand by 'proposition'. The disputes are over whether such things exists, and whether they are features of minds or features of the world (resembling facts). |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
Full Idea: We can find the ground of a pure conceptual truth only in other conceptual truths. | |
From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref) | |
A reaction: Elsewhere he insists that these grounds must be in 'truths', and not just in the attributes of the concepts of involved. This conflicts with Kit Fine's view, that the concepts themselves are the source of conceptual truth and necessity. |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
Full Idea: The greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke: - he may be liable to forget. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: And that's before you get to the problem of how the greatest knower could possibly know whether or not they knew absolutely everything, or whether there might be some fact which was irremediably hidden from them. |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
Full Idea: We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture of good and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: And, of course, what counts as 'goods' or 'evils' seems to have a highly relative aspect to it. To claim that really it is all good is massive hope based on flimsy evidence. |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: The truth of God's existence certainly is a challenging test case for the pragmatic theory of truth, and James really bites the bullet here. Pragmatism may ultimately founder on the impossibility of specifying what 'works satisfactorily' means. |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
Full Idea: To the grub under the bark the exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism to extract him would certainly argue a diabolical designer. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: What an elegant sentence! The huge problem for religious people who accept (probably reluctantly) evolution by natural selection is the moral nature of the divine being who could use such a ruthless method of design. |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
Full Idea: The parts of things must always make some definite resultant, be it chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly designed to ensure it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: In so far as the design argument is an analogy with human affairs, we can't deny that high levels of order suggest an organising mind, and mere chaos suggests a coincidence of unco-ordinated forces. |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
Full Idea: I myself believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: There is not much you can say to someone who claims incontrovertible evidence which is utterly private to themselves. Does total absence of private religious experience count as evidence on the subject? |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |
Full Idea: Nirvana means safety from the everlasting round of adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the buddhist for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully American! From what I have seen of eastern thought, including Taoism, I agree with James, in general. There is a rejection of knowledge and of human life which I find shocking. I suspect it is a defence mechanism for downtrodden people. |