Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Science (4 vols)', 'Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions' and 'Many Politics'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
Nomads are the basis of history, and yet almost unknowable [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: There is no history from the viewpoint of nomads, although everything passes through them, to the point that they are like the noumena or the unknowable of history.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (Many Politics [1977], p.107)
     A reaction: Nomads have the same place in society that indeterminate 'stuff' has in an object-orientated metaphysics. Deleuze seems to be romanticising nomads the way the late Victorians romanticised gypsies.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
     Full Idea: Bolzano said the 'laws of thought' (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are true, but nothing of interest follows from them. Logic obeys them, but they are not logic's first principles or axioms.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], §3) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic
     A reaction: An interesting and crucial distinction. For samples of proposed axioms of logic, see Ideas 6408, 7798 and 7797.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
     Full Idea: Bolzano if the father of 'arithmetization', which sought to found all of analysis on the concepts of arithmetic and to eliminate geometrical notions entirely (with logicism taking it a step further, by reducing arithmetic to logic).
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 3
     A reaction: Brown's book is a defence of geometrical diagrams against Bolzano's approach. Bolzano sounds like the modern heir of Pythagoras, if he thinks that space is essentially numerical.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Bolzano began the process of eliminating intuition from analysis, by proving something apparently obvious (that as continuous function must be zero at some point). Proof reveals on what a theorem rests, and that it is not intuition.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: Kant was the target of Bolzano's attack. Two responses might be to say that many other basic ideas are intuited but impossible to prove, or to say that proof itself depends on intuition, if you dig deep enough.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: Mathematical proofs are philosophical in method if they do not only demonstrate that a certain mathematical truth holds but if they also disclose why it holds, that is, if they uncover its grounds.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3
     A reaction: I aim to defend the role of explanation in mathematics, but this says that this is only if the proofs are 'philosophical', which may be of no interest to mathematicians. Oh well, that's their loss.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Bolzano was determined to expel Kantian intuition from analysis, and to prove from first principles anything that could be proved, no matter how obvious it might seem when thought of in geometrical terms.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 2.3
     A reaction: This is characteristic of the Enlightenment Project, well after the Enlightenment. It is a step towards Frege's attack on 'psychologism' in mathematics. The problem is that it led us into a spurious platonism. We live in troubled times.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
     Full Idea: It is of the essence of consciousness to transcend itself
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
     A reaction: As usual, I am a bit baffled by these sorts of pronouncement. Sounds like an oxymoron to me. Maybe it is a development of Schopenhauer's thought.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Emotion returns to its object every moment, and feeds upon it. …The emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. Emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world. …[39] It is a transformation of the world.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
     A reaction: The last sentence is the essence (or existence?) of Sartre's core theory of the emotions. They are, it seems, a mode of perception, like a colour filter added to a camera. I don't think I agree. I see them as a response to perceptions, not part of them.
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger's sense of verstehen) its Being-in-the-World. …It has a meaning.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
     A reaction: Calling emotions a 'mode' suggests that this way of understanding is intermittent, which seems wrong. Even performing arithmetical calculations is coloured by emotions, so they go deeper than a 'mode'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Joy is the magical behaviour which tries, by incantation, to realise the possession of the desired object as an instantaneous totality. [47] Emotions are all reducible to the constitution of a magic world by using our bodies as instruments of incantation.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
     A reaction: I can't pretend to understand this, but I am reminded of the fact that the so-called primary qualities of perception are innately boring, and it is only the secondary qualities (like colour and smell) which make the world interesting.
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Emotion is a phenomenon of belief. Consciousness does not limit itself to the projection of affective meanings upon the world around it; it lives the new world it has thereby constituted.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
     A reaction: There seems to be an implied anti-realism in this, since the emotions prevent us from relating more objectively to the world. The 'magic' seems to be compulsory.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Bolzano took the entities of which truth is predicated to be not propositions in the subjective sense but 'propositions-in-themselves' - objective entities existing independent of our apprehension.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Emp'
     A reaction: A serious mistake. Presumably the objective propositions are all true (or there would be endless infinities of them). So what is assessed in the case of error? Something other than the objective propositions! We assess these other things!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: Bolzano conceived of propositions as abstract objects which are structured compounds of concepts and potential contents of judgements and assertions.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3
     A reaction: Personally I think of propositions as brain events, the constituents of thought about the world, but that needn't contradict the view of them as 'abstract'.
A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: What I mean by 'propositions' is not what the grammarians call a proposition, namely the linguistic expression, but the mere sense of this expression, is what is meant by proposition in itself or object proposition. This sense can be true or false.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref?)
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of what we understand by 'proposition'. The disputes are over whether such things exists, and whether they are features of minds or features of the world (resembling facts).
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: We can find the ground of a pure conceptual truth only in other conceptual truths.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref)
     A reaction: Elsewhere he insists that these grounds must be in 'truths', and not just in the attributes of the concepts of involved. This conflicts with Kit Fine's view, that the concepts themselves are the source of conceptual truth and necessity.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Max Weber observed that states possess a monopoly of legitimate violence.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 2 'State'
     A reaction: This sounds rather hair-raising, and often is, but it sounds quite good if we describe it as a denial of legitimate violence to individual citizens. Hobbes would like it, since individual violence breaches some sort of natural contract. Guns in USA.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
We are currently extending capitalism to the whole of society [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: What characterises our situation is ….the extension of capitalism to the whole social body.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (Many Politics [1977], p.110)
     A reaction: This is driven by the naïve people who think all problems can be solved by market forces, and that to everything that goes bankrupt we should just say 'good riddance'.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The State requires self-preservation, but the war-machine desires destruction [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: There will always be a tension between the State apparatus with its requirement for self-preservation, and the war-machine in its undertaking to destroy the State, to destroy the subjects of the State, and even to destroy itself.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (Many Politics [1977], p.106)
     A reaction: This seems to fit WWI quite well, but the desire of the war-machine to destroy the State which pays for it sounds unlikely. Nevertheless war is appalling for the state, but it is the whole point of the war-machine, which gets restless.