Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are Persons Bodies?', 'Things qua Truthmakers' and 'Phil of Mathematics: why nothing works'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism

3663	How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Platonism has the attendant problem of how we can succeed in thinking about and referring to entities we can have no causal transactions with.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Phil of Mathematics: why nothing works [1979], Modalism)

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

14401	Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being.
	From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI
	A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being.

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons

3238	'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
	From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
	A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.

3239	You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
	From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
	A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?