5 ideas
| 8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
| Full Idea: It is not always possible for nominalists to translate all statements putatively about universals as statements about particulars. It is not possible for 'red is a colour' and 'red resembles pink more than blue' | |
| From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.89) | |
| A reaction: His second example strikes me as the biggest challenge facing nominalism. I wish they wouldn't use secondary qualities as examples. I am unconvinced that the existence of universals will improve the explanation. It's a mystery. |
| 8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
| Full Idea: Some red things resemble some blue things more than some pink things because of factors other than colour. Nominalists must offer 'anything red colour-resembles anything pink', but that may contain a universal in disguise. | |
| From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.90) | |
| A reaction: Hume and Quine are probably right that we spot resemblances instantly, and only articulate the respect of the resemblance at a later stage. |
| 9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An a priori proof is a proof independent of experience. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Primary Truths [1686]) | |
| A reaction: Burge says Leibniz gave the first modern account of a priori knowledge. There may be no explicit reference to experience involved, but it would beg many questions to deny that implicit experience may be at the root of the proof. |
| 3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74) | |
| A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality. |
| 3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81) | |
| A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love? |